

DECLASSIFIED

THE RHINE BRIDGES



-KEY-


- == PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- +++ RAIL BRIDGE
- .-.- FERRY BRIDGE
- III COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE
- CROSSING SITE
- > BRIDGE UNDER CONSTRUCTION

17 1200 AFEB.
ENCL. #1 TO
WEEKLY INTELL.
SUM. #22

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
SCALE: 1/500,000

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED




DECLASSIFIED

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 171200 AFEB.

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #22

● **DECLASSIFIED** ●



Section of defense overprint
Sheet 7512 ALTENHEIM

200/FEB. 45/6 AG 6051

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
Scale 1/25,000
0 1/8 1/4 1/2
STATUTE MILES

G-2 6th Army Group
Encl. no. 3 to G-2 Weekly
Intell. Summary no. 22

DECLASSIFIED

P-60

94

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

By Auth of :
CG, 6 Army Group :
Initials: 114 :
Date: 10 Feb 45 :
:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 21

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 10 FEBRUARY 1945

828
31

EB 17 Feb
light
m

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The departure of all known reserves from the SAAR-PALATINATE for other fronts and the destruction of the German Nineteenth Army's offensive power in southern ALSACE have placed the enemy entirely on the defensive in these areas.

Army Group G is supervising First German Army, whose sector extends from the MOSELLE River to the RHINE River. Operations are controlled by the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 256 Inf, and 416 Inf Divs); LXXXV Infantry (719 Inf, and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG and 559 Inf Divs); XC Infantry (6 SS Mtn, and 36 Inf Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf, and 257 Inf Divs).

The exigencies of other fronts forced Army Group G to regroup its forces considerably. LXXXV Infantry Corps was shifted from the Seventh Army to the First Army, moving in between LXXXII Infantry and XIII SS Corps, with no change in actual divisional strength. This probably permitted the direct subordination of LXXXIX Corps to First Army. Two more divisions (21 Pz and 10 SS) left the front; their sectors were covered by a shift of 257 Infantry Division and the assumption of organizational control by 905 Divisional Staff. 256 Infantry Division moved across the front and was identified operating in conjunction with 11 Panzer Division, whose relief it is now in position to effect. 6 SS Mountain Division spread its forces thinly over the sector vacated by 256 and 257 Infantry Divisions. The general debility of Army Group G's front in organic divisional units is probably partially made up by Volkssturm infantry and a larger allotment of GHQ troops, particularly artillery. There is a possibility that elements salvaged from the Nineteenth Army may be used, but no other reserves seem at this time available.

The Nineteenth Army was destroyed as an effective fighting force. By 1200 hours on 10 February over 22,000 permanent casualties could be charged against it, as well as the loss of 55 armored vehicles and 66 artillery pieces. It is estimated that no more than 3,000/4,000 combat infantry effectives were successfully evacuated, with only a slightly higher figure for supporting arms and service troops. They could serve as cadre for rebuilding two or three very weak divisions. The present shortage of headquarters and staffs may cause a rapid reidentification of some of the higher formations, particularly the corps headquarters, but their relation to the units beaten in southern ALSACE will be only numerical.

East of the RHINE it is assumed that Army Group OBERRHINE has returned to its preoperations status of OBERRHINE Defense Command. Its command is exercised through XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps southward along the RHINE to a point near FREIBURG where Twenty-fourth Army assumes control. Twenty-fourth Army has been confirmed as definitely in control of the Swiss border region and the upper RHINE south of BADENWEILER (V 9513), known to be the headquarters of XVIII SS Corps in late January.

The ultimate role of Nineteenth Army is still conjectural. From its present headquarters at BADENWEILER, it will at least temporarily assume command of the area east of the former pocket, while its remnants reassemble. It may be used in an operational role under Army Group G, relieving the First Army of the HARDT Mountain - RHINE River sector. Finally, it may remain in the eastern RHINE Valley, exercising administrative control over the miscellaneous units which garrison the region. However, since the function of command in this area is administrative rather than operational, this possibility is the least likely.

REGRADED

BY

ON

29 AUG 1946

DECLASSIFIED

Reg # 1112344

DECLASSIFIED

b. Capabilities

For the moment the enemy has only one capability on the Sixth Army Group front: namely, to defend himself. In the northern sector he can attempt to hold on the successive positions of (1) the present line; (2) the MAGINOT Line and the line of the RHINE; and (3) the SIEGFRIED Line. Limited objective spoiling attacks can be launched in the SAAR area. Along the RHINE he is capable only of harassing raids while he marshals his forces for the defensive.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), DRUSENHEIM (R 1517), South along RHINE River to the Swiss Border.

THE ENEMY STRENGTH FIGURE GIVEN IN SIXTH US ARMY GROUP WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES ALWAYS REPRESENTS THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVES, UNLESS QUALIFIED. IT INCLUDES ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UNIT INFANTRY OR PANZER GRENADIER REGIMENTS, THE RECONNAISSANCE OR FUSILIER BATTALION, THE REINFORCEMENT BATTALION, AND THE COMBAT ENGINEER BATTALION. SUPPORTING OR AUXILIARY TROOPS ARE NOT COUNTED IN THE COMBAT INFANTRY EFFECTIVE STRENGTH, SINCE ESTIMATION OF THEIR STRENGTH MUST USUALLY BE CONJECTURAL AND WITHOUT EVEN THE DOUBTFUL BASIS OF THE NUMBER OF KNOWN CASUALTIES AND INTERROGATION REPORTS. IT IS ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT A PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF SUPPORTING TROOPS, BOTH DIVISIONAL AND GHQ, ARE TO BE ADDED IN ORDER TO ARRIVE AT A FIGURE REPRESENTING THE ENEMY'S OVERALL COMBAT STRENGTH.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ ?)

There have been a number of reports which indicate that BLASKOWITZ has been transferred to an Army Group command on the Eastern front. However, this change has not yet been confirmed. His possible successor is not known.

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLEIN)

Corps headquarters has been at WADERN (L 3904) since 6 December 1944. An identification on 1 February placed it specifically in a building at the road bend approximately 70 yards southeast of the village church.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) had only a short rest after its withdrawal from the BITCHE area, for elements of it have already been contacted south of the MOSELLE. So far, however, only 256 Artillery Regiment has been identified, at L 0504 on 7 February. It is believed that the rest of the division will soon go into line to take the place of 11 Panzer Division. Combat infantry strength of division: 2,000.

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is responsible for the line from the MOSELLE to the vicinity of L 0205. Identifications: 712 Grenadier Regiment, on 5 February at L 1399 and L 1498; 713 Grenadier Regiment, on 7 February at L 0502; 714 Grenadier Regiment, on 4 February at L 0502. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 3,500.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIEFERSHEIM) was identified in the same general area as 416 Infantry Division, suggesting that the two divisions may have been engaged on a combined mission with 11 Panzer lending support with its mobile and armored forces. Only 110 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was met during the period, at L 0504 on 7 February. It is believed that the bulk of the division has been withdrawn. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 4,000 supported by about 50 tanks.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(b) LXXXV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. KNISS)

The presence of this corps in the SAAR was established by prisoner statements that it controlled 719 Infantry and 347 Infantry Divisions. It formerly formed part of the German Seventh Army in the ARDENNES sector.

719 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. GEDE) is holding a broad front from MERZIG to a point immediately north of SAARLAUTERN. 719 Fusilier Battalion was the only unit identified during the period, at Q 2981 on 4 February. Reinforcements were received at the end of January from 34 Reserve Grenadier Regiment. Combat infantry effective strength is estimated at 4,500.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) is holding the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to east of FORBACH (Q 4263). Recent identifications of 860 Regiment disprove the assumption that it had been completely absorbed by 861 Regiment and make it appear that such dissolution as took place was merely a temporary measure. In addition, 880 Grenadier Regiment received reinforcements in the form of 80 and 107 Replacement Battalions of 172 Reserve Division, 347 Field Replacement Battalion, and 5 company of 861 Grenadier Regiment. In all probability, the division has acquired 880 Regiment in order to provide the necessary troops to bring it up to the standard 3 regiment - 2 battalion basis. During the period, the following units were identified: 860 Regiment on 6 February at Q 3567; and 880 Regiment at Q 3665 and 4063 on 7 February. Last contact with 861 Regiment was on 29 January. Generally, the division proved to be more aggressive than it had been for quite some time. For on 7 February it mounted a small scale attack in the OETING (Q 4064) area which forced the withdrawal of friendly outposts. Combat infantry strength is carried at 2,400.

(c) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) continued to hold the sector from east of FORBACH (Q 4263) to Q 6055 and was comparatively inactive during the period. The 59 Grenadier Regiment which was identified on 7 February at Q 4862 evidently has an extremely weak I Battalion and there is some doubt as to whether or not the II Battalion has been reconstituted. The only other identification made during the period was that of 119 Artillery Regiment on 7 February at Q 5057. 74 Grenadier Regiment was last contacted on 1 February while 73 Grenadier Regiment has not put in an appearance since 7 January. The division combat infantry effective strength, including Battle Group KLEIN, is estimated at 1,700.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: Col. KLINGENBERG) continued to hold the sector from Q 6055 to the BITCHE area at Q 7750. During the period the division maintained relatively close contact, probably due to its recent strengthening and the consequent boost in aggressive spirit. 37 SS and 38 SS Grenadier Regiments were identified on the 6th and 7th of February respectively, the latter at Q 6353. 17 SS Reconnaissance Battalion was also identified on 5 February at Q 6455.

The division has received considerable reinforcements recently. Some 700 effectives for the grenadier regiments arrived from IGLAU (CZECHOSLOVAKIA). The reconnaissance battalion is also reported to have been brought up to strength. Considering this rejuvenation, combat infantry effectives of the division are now estimated at 2,500. Battle Group KENTER, with a strength of 300, is still believed to be in reserve, although it was not contacted during the week. It is believed that the estimated number of tanks and SP guns operating with the division has risen to approximately 40.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) holds a sector from the woods south of BITCHE to Q 7545 with 1126 and 1127 Grenadier Regiments in line. Last identifications were: 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 6 February in the vicinity of Q 7446; 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 7 February in the vicinity of Q 7549. 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment has not been identified for a long period and may be undergoing reconstitution. 1126 Grenadier Regiment received a small number of replacements but no further refitting seems to have taken place within the division. A scarcity of heavy weapons has been noted within the unit for it has been proven that some of the battalion heavy weapons companies do not exist. Combat infantry strength is estimated at 2,200.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(d) XC Corps (CG: ?)

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) expanded further to the west as 257 Volksgrenadier Division went out of line. The division is now defending stubbornly from Q 7545 to Q 8435. Identifications: 11 SS Mountain Regiment, 4 February at Q 7639 and Q 7441, 8 February at Q 7639; 12 SS Mountain Regiment, 5 February at Q 7839; 6 SS Mountain Artillery Regiment, 9 February at Q 8237. Thus the westward extension of the divisional sector was accomplished by 11 Mountain Regiment sidestepping from the left to the right flank of 12 Mountain Regiment. Partial reorganization within the infantry component took place as returning convalescents and rear echelon personnel were allotted to both regiments. Some companies were dissolved in the process of consolidation. Combat infantry strength totals approximately 2,200.

36 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) is committed from Q 8435 to Q 9028. Close contact was maintained during the period as the following units were identified: 87 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 5 and 7 February at Q 8532; 118 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 8 February at Q 8929; 165 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 4 February at Q 8631. 87 and 165 Grenadier Regiments continue to have only one battalion each in the area, the others presumably remaining at BAUMHOLDER. Not including these battalions which should have been ready for commitment several weeks ago, the divisional combat infantry strength is estimated to be 2,000, including 51 German Air Force Fortress Battalion.

(e) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HOEHNE)

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER) is holding a very narrow sector between 36 and 47 Infantry Divisions. During the period, the units of the division were not satisfactorily identified due to the quiet which prevailed on the front. Combat infantry strength is 2,500 men.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) was in very light contact during the period. The only identification was that of 104 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9228, indicating a slight westward shift. 47 Volksgrenadier Division is believed to cover from Q 9128 to R 0225. Casualties during the period seem to have been negligible and combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Col. SEIDEL). As mentioned above, this division was withdrawn from its old sector south of 559 Volksgrenadier Division on or about 4 February. It lost no time in moving east to the HAGUENAU area where it, in turn, relieved 10 SS Panzer Division. The following identifications were made in its new sector from R 0225 to north of BISCHWILLER (R 1020); 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 9 February at R 0324; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 7 February at OBERHOFFEN (R 0919); 477 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 9 February, at R 0920. Since there have been no indications of replacements, combat infantry strength is carried at 1,700.

10 SS Panzer Division (CG: SS Brig. Gen. HARMEL) left Sixth US Army Group front about 6 February. PW's claimed their destination was to be the BERLIN front. At the time of its relief by 257 Volksgrenadier Division, 10 SS still had combat infantry strength of approximately 2,800, supported by about 50 tanks and assault guns. Considerable replacements had been received prior to the division's departure.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

c. OBERRHHEIN DEFENCE COMMAND

(1) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI)

905 Mobilization Division was shown by captured documents and PW statements to have taken over the group of miscellaneous units formerly under control of 553 Volksgrenadier Divisional Staff. A captured code list dated 1 February placed the following units under its control: 2 SS Police Regt (GIESEKE), comprised of II Bn 2 SS Police Regt, III Bn 2 SS Police Regt, and VI Gren Bn OBERRHHEIN (MORG); 2 Gren Regt OBERRHHEIN (MARBACH), comprised of Police School HEIDENHEIM (GRUTZNER), I Gren Bn Army NCO School ETTLINGEN (TREUTTLER), Gren Bn XIII Corps Area NCO School (SCHMIDT), and IV Gren Bn OBERRHHEIN (WAGNER); 1514 Fortress Arty Bn (SCHMITZ); 1539 Fortress Arty Bn (MAYER); 405 Engr Bn (TERJUNG); Pz Engr Co FELDHERNHALLE; 831 Engr Bn; 833 Mtn Engr Bn; 68 AA Regt; 405 AT Bn; and AA Hq TAUCHNITZ. Both its number and location suggest that it is a Wehrkreis V unit. The strength total of the former 553 Division subsidiaries has been reduced considerably by casualties and by the identification of a few of its units in the VOSGES pocket. In addition, elements of 2 SS Police Regiment were identified at R 0621, in the 257 Volksgrenadier Division sector on 7 February. The other sub-units which were not identified during the period, are believed to be responsible for the sector from R 1020 to the RHINE (R 1614). Combat infantry effectives are estimated at 1,500.

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER). The staff of this division was withdrawn in all probability for reorganization. There had been reports of 1120 Grenadier Regiment reforming in PFORZHEIM and prisoners claimed that the reconstruction of the division was to take place in south-west Germany. Thus it is possible that the whole division is now being rebuilt in the PFORZHEIM area.

405 zbV Division remains responsible for a portion of the SIEGFRIED Line in the Black Forest.

(2) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH or ROTH)

30 SS Grenadier Division continues to be carried in the OFFENBURG-FREIBURG area.

805 Mobilization Division is the second new divisional staff reported to have been formed in Wehrkreis V. It is said to be located in the FREIBURG area. Nothing is known of the component units.

(3) Twenty-fourth Army (CG: Gen. HANS SCHMIDT)

This headquarters is now accepted on the strength of several documentary and prisoner interrogation reports. It has been located variously at BADENWEILER (V 91) and ENGEL (W 7717). It controls the Swiss border area for a distance of approximately 50 kilometers north of the border.

(4) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) is considered virtually destroyed, having lost over 4,700 men in prisoners and at least 1,000 other casualties during its commitment in the VOSGES. The predominantly Austrian personnel of the division gave a poor account of itself, as indicated by the relatively high rate of desertion.

198 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BARTEL) was engaged heavily to the end and fought well. Approximately 1,000 prisoners were taken and the division may have managed to rescue about 500 of its effectives. Colonel BARTEL was reported to have succeeded Brigadier General SCHIEL as division commander.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Lt. Col. JUNGE) was mauled very badly in its defense of COLMAR. 1,250 PW's were taken from it and it is not believed that more than 300 combat effectives succeeded in crossing the RHINE. Lt. Col. JUNGE, ex-Commander of 1213 Grenadier Regiment, was stated to have relieved Colonel ZORN.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. BLECKWENN) was not contacted during the period. It is believed to have pulled its battered remnants across the river about 3 February, but it is not believed that more than 500 combat infantry effectives remained.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) lost at least 1,300 prisoners. A captured order sets the phases of withdrawal from 4 to 7 February. During this period the division was to offer delaying action on consecutive lines, finally holding a sector along the ILL River south-west of DESSENHEIM (V 8130). The following units were attached to the division: Regiment GROSSJOHANN, AZERBEIDJAN Legion (BG LANG?), 3 Grenadier Battalion OBERRHEIN, 360 Cossack Regiment, 4 Border Guard Battalion, Regiment Group 1214 (189 VG Div), SS Battalion ELLWANGEN, BG SCHLAGER, and 1516 Fortress Artillery Battalion. A good part of these units managed to extricate themselves, but organic combat infantry elements of 16 Volksgrenadier Division that survived amount to not more than 400.

(b) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EWERT) managed to pull the bulk of its units out of the VOSGES area, before the closing of the Allied pincers movement succeeded. However, this initial escape did not relieve the division's plight, because 757 Grenadier Regiment suffered very heavy casualties when committed south of COLMAR, 758 Grenadier Regiment was destroyed in the ILL-THUR triangle, and 759 Regiment was mauled during its hasty retreat. 1750 PW's were taken and not more than 400 combat infantry effectives got to the east bank of the RHINE

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BURCKY) finally abandoned CERNAY, after a stubborn defense that is estimated to have cost the division 800 killed or permanently disabled and 1,200 prisoners. Remnants total 400 combat infantry effectives.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) 426 dead attest to the heavy losses suffered by the division in its determined defense of the area north of MULHOUSE. Prisoners totalled over 800. 736 Grenadier Regiment, never identified, was not included in a captured list of component units dated 16 January. Thus the dissolution of this regiment can be accepted. Remnants of the others do not exceed 300 combat infantry effectives.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)
(See note on strength, page 2, paragraph 2)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Infantry Effectives)

Seventh US Army Front	21,000
First French Army Front	4,000 *

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army Front	10,000
-----------------------	--------

Reserves:

Estimated Reserves in SAAR	7,500
Estimated Reserves in Black Forest	10,000

T O T A L	52,500
-----------	--------

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh US Army Front	80-100
Reserve (11 Pz Div)	40- 50

(*) Remnants of Nineteenth Army

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVILLE SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TAVOR (K 3022), AIGUILLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Continuous rumors about withdrawal of German units from the Alpine front and their replacement by Italian units have not as yet been substantiated by more precise information. However, line crossers from the SAORGE (N 8309) region indicated that some, or even possibly all, of the German artillery units in the northern part of the ROYA River valley have been replaced by Italian artillery units. This information, if correct, could explain reports about additional German artillery that had arrived in the SAN REMO area.

Furthermore ground sources reported repeatedly that the German High Command of the Alpine front has received orders to begin the retreat in PIEDMONT, leaving the responsibility for the entire Alpine front to Italian units. However, this plan has apparently been abandoned due to the present conditions of roads, the use of gasoline substitutes, and the necessity for night road movements, all of which would create too great a risk of losing all heavy material.

Few identifications were made due to lack of contact because of the weather conditions in the high mountain passes. During the period only the 253 and 107 Grenadier Regiments of the 34 Infantry Division were identified.

Until further clarification, it is accepted that elements of 5 Mountain Division are still part of the Alpine front garrison intermingled with elements of the MONTE ROSA and LITTORIO Divisions.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS Vosges Front

In spite of stubborn enemy resistance to the French forces advancing from the south at the beginning of the period the enemy's west-east bridge route across the THUR River was cut by the capture of ENSISHEIM (V 7118). Immediately thereafter, crossings were made at WITTELSHEIM (V 6312) which caused the opposition along the THUR to collapse and paved the way for the immediate capture of RAEDERSHEIM (V 6523) and SOULTZ (V 6222). During this period the enemy was attempting to evacuate his forces from the VOSGES between RHEINKOPF (V 4334) and the SCHLUCT pass (V 4740). In the north he stiffened his resistance along the line HERRLISHEIM-HUSSEREN (V 6637) to assist the VOSGES evacuation and simultaneously put up a strong defence in the NEUF BRISACH area supported by heavy artillery fire from the KAISERSTUHL across the river. The junction of friendly troops from the north and south was finally made at ROUFFACH (V 6728) on 5 February, encircling an estimated 1,000 enemy in the VOSGES.

The next day, our forces found the western approach to the BRISACH bridge unusable while to the east, the ILL River Line from ST CROIX EN PLAINE (V 7334) to NIEDERENTZEN (V 7428) was completely secured.

By 7 February the area between the RHINE-RHONE Canal and the ILL River had been cleared of enemy and NEUF BRISACH was completely in our hands. At this point in the battle the only bridge over the RHINE remaining for enemy use was the damaged NEUNBURG bridge at V 8512 but additional means were being improvised by the extensive use of ferries. The strong enemy opposition to bridgehead attempts at ILE NAPOLEON (V 7407) was overcome and our advance began in the HARTH Forest. In the north, stragglers continued to be ferreted out of the hills as GUEBWILLER was taken. The RHINE was cleared as far south as BALGAU (V 8525). Contact along the entire perimeter of the remaining front was made only with disorganized remnants who appeared to be under instructions to make their way across the RHINE individually as best they could. The 3 mile bridgehead which remained before CHALAMPE (V 8513) on 8 February collapsed the next day at 0800 when the southern ALSACE pocket was officially declared clear. At the end of the period only large calibre artillery fire from the opposite bank broke the tranquillity of First French Army's WACHT AM RHEIN.

Saar-Palatinate Front

In the HAGUENAU area, ROHRWILLER (R 1217) was cleared early in the period, but subsequent advance in this area was slowed by floods and heavy enemy fire. OBERHOFFEN (R 0920) and DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) were stubbornly defended by vigorous infantry counterattacks supported by tanks. By 7 February OFFENDORF (R 1212) and HERRLISHEIM (R 1214) were found evacuated but heavily mined and booby trapped.

The enemy proved alert to our patrols in the area of BITCHOFFEN (Q 9028) during the period where continuous rear area activity and movement were reported.

In the HARDT Mountain sector the enemy appeared to be digging in to compensate for his extended line of defence. Patrol raids on BISCHOLTZ (Q 8532) and ROTHBACH (Q 8434) inflicted heavy enemy casualties but found him expectant.

In the area west of the HARDT small enemy attacks and infiltrations were attempted south of BLIESBRUCK (Q 5957), and at Q 7447. South of OETING (Q 4063) friendly outposts were forced to withdraw slightly. Light resistance was made to friendly raids on GROESBLIEDERSTROFF (Q 4862), while the enemy was observed defending the woods of LE BRANDENBUSCH (Q 4763). By the end of the period activity had diminished to occasional spurts of small arms and automatic weapons fire.

On the ALPINE Front two Italian Marines, together with a fifteen foot motorboat, two depth charges and a twenty-one inch torpedo, were captured on 5/6 February at S 7683. On 9/10 February there fell into our hands two line crossers, one enemy agent, one German deserter and a Russian deserter.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. Tactical Reconnaissance

The total liquidation of the VOSGES Pocket brought with it large-scale withdrawals of men and equipment along the roads and railroads leading north and east from FREIBURG. To the north, indications of enemy departures were evident in the extremely heavy activity noted in the RHINE Valley from KARLSRUHE to BINGEN. Lines running east from the RHINE likewise revealed some movement away from our front. Activity in the SAAR points to normal supply movements as well as redeployment of enemy forces.

The close of the current period saw the last enemy elements driven across the RHINE from the COLMAR Pocket leaving bridges at CHALAMPE and BRISACH demolished. The roads leading north and east to FREIBURG and ETTENHEIM were very active as trucks, motorcycles, tanks, and armored force vehicles, moved toward assemble areas, rail centers and main lines of communication. Heavy activity along the OFFENBURG - FREIBURG rail axis suggests the arrival and formation of trains destined to alleviate the problems of speedy evacuation. Later in the week, lines running north and east from OFFENBURG revealed traffic moving away from the battle area, thus substantiating the view that military withdrawals were underway.

All along the RHINE Valley from KARLSRUHE as far north as BINGEN, extremely heavy rail activity prevailed throughout the entire period. More than 100 trains were observed in this area, with the preponderance of traffic moving north and east away from our front. In the vicinity of BINGEN, light to moderate two way rail traffic was noticed.

Slight rail activity, probably representing the movement of replacements and supplies, was noted along east-west lines leading from the east into the SAAR. The moderately heavy activity noted in the KAISERSLAUTERN - NEUNKIRCHEN - ZWEIBRUCKEN area is possibly the source of the light traffic seen moving north via BAD KREUZNACH toward MAINZ or BINGEN, suggesting some departure from the SAAR.

B. Status of Enemy Communications

The Tactical and Strategic air forces continued to launch successful air attacks on enemy marshalling yards and communication centers as well as effecting 121 rail cuts and destroying 6 rail and 2 road bridges during the period. A large part of the damage wrought was concentrated in the FREIBURG - DONAUESCHINGEN - OFFENBURG triangle causing heavy damage to equipment and temporarily halting through traffic along these lines. In order to offset the disruption caused by these aerial bombardments, it was necessary for the enemy to rely largely upon motor transport in order to effect the eastward evacuation of troops and equipment from the NEUENBERG - BREISACH area. Direct rail movement to TUTTLINGEN and STUTTGART from the DONAUESCHINGEN - FREIBURG - OFFENBURG area was also brought to a temporary standstill as a result of these attacks.

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INC.


- #1 Inc - The Rhine Bridges
- #2 Inc - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION

"Special"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED



**NINETEENTH ARMY
REMNANTS**

LXIII Corps LXIV Corps

- | | |
|-----|-----|
| 159 | 198 |
| 338 | 189 |
| 716 | 708 |
| 106 | 16 |
| | 2 |

SCALE 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km

200/FEB 145/6 AG 6049


DECLASSIFIED

ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 10 1200 AFEB.

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #21

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

THE RHINE BRIDGES



-KEY-

- == PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- +++ RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- == COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY IN OPERATION

10 1200 AFEB.
ENCL. #1 TO
WEEKLY INTELL.
SUM. #21

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
SCALE: 1/500,000

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

MIRS (b) 12/28 10 Feb

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP

Office of the A. C. of S., G-2

AP-23, U. S. Army


P-23

By Auth of

CG, 6 Army Group

Initials: ELH

Date: 3 Feb 45



WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 20

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 3 FEBRUARY 1945

MIRS
War Office

14023

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Confirmation of several probabilities has further clarified the enemy situation on the Sixth US Army Group front.

The cessation of offensive action by the enemy in the SAAR-PALATINATE was marked by the withdrawal of several major units and concomitant realignment of responsibilities. Army Group G may be assumed to have regained control of the whole northern sector as far as the RHINE, after the failure of HIMMLER's politico-military campaign in ALSACE. From the west the corps are aligned as follows: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (257 VG, 6 SS Mtn, and 36 Inf Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf, and 10 SSPz Divs). XXXIX Panzer Corps, formerly controlling the HAGUENAU area, probably relinquished its command and followed in the withdrawal of its three major units (25 PG, 21 Pz and 7 Para Divs). The First Army remains as the intermediate echelon, with the probability that LXXXIX Corps is operating independently under the army group, for the same logistical and tactical reasons which previously made the similar situation expedient.

Behind the RHINE, Army Group OBERRHEIN is returning to its purely administrative defence command status. The loss of XXXIX Panzer Corps and the imminent liquidation of the Nineteenth Army will remove from its control all offensive forces. XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps now can have only a defensive role under a still elusive higher echelon (Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army). In the rapidly constricting COLMAR pocket, no changes in organization were noted.

Along the entire front, the enemy's offensive power has been completely eliminated. West of the HARDT only screening forces have been contacted, with defensive positions obviously under construction. In the HARDT mountain sector, a gradual sidestepping process by 257 Infantry and 6 SS Mountain Divisions permitted the withdrawal of 256 Infantry Division. East of the HARDT 10 SS Pz Division has been forced to spread thinly from the RHINE to limits west of HAGUENAU, helping to cover the sectors vacated by 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier and 7 Parachute Divisions. Although no positive evidence is as yet available, the recent pattern of train movements suggests that all four of the divisions withdrawn are destined for employment on other sectors of the front.

In the VOSGES area, the orderly disengagement of the Nineteenth Army began to show signs of hasty retreat. 708 Infantry Division had already fallen back across the river, while 16 Volksgrenadier, 189 Volksgrenadier, and 198 Infantry Divisions were beginning to lose organic cohesion. Reinforcements from 5 Mountain Division were unable to bolster the weak 2 Mountain Division to the point where it could do more than fight a delaying action. North of MULHOUSE the few remaining troops of 716 Infantry, 159 Infantry and 338 Infantry Divisions were battling to keep the southern shoulder of the pocket firm.

The enemy was completely on the defensive along the entire Sixth US Army Group front.

REGRADED

DECLASSIFIED
BY: [Signature]
DATE: 3 May 72
[Signature]
[Signature]
[Signature]
13 Jul 76

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

b. Capabilities

The enemy has but one capability remaining: to defend himself. He can best execute this capability by withdrawing behind the bastions of the SIEGFRIED Line and the RHINE. In the SAAR-PALATINATE, the present line and the MAGINOT Line could be manned as delaying positions. In the south the enemy can choose only between the RHINE and destruction.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing Sixth US Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLINGEN (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHRON (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), KALTENHOUSE (R 0721), R 1021, R 1120, BISCHWILLER (R 1019), R 1416, HERRLISHEIM (R 1215), R 0714, R 1410, along RHINE River to V 8841, BIESHEIM (V 8638), V 6939, V 6046, V 4845, V 4629, V 6010, ENSISHEIM (V 7118), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE River to the Swiss Border.

b. XXXIX Panzer Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. KIRCHENTRAUER von KIRCHDORF)

The withdrawal of this corps and 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, and 7 Parachute Divisions was started during the early days of the period. The last date of contact with units of the corps was 30 January and it is believed that their departure is nearly complete.

21 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. FEUCHTINGER) was pulled out of line shortly after the failure to cross the Moder River on 24/25 January. The division was in a battered state, and had been located in a sector that can well be held defensively by a unit of lower efficiency. The larger portion of its responsibilities were probably inherited by the units under control of 553 Divisional Staff. Last information shows 21 Panzer Division having 1,400 effectives and 30-35 armored vehicles including self-propelled guns.

25 Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BAUMEISTER) was last identified by a PW of 119 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 30 January. 35 Panzer Grenadier Regiment has been out of contact since 25 January. The combat effectives of the division were estimated at less than 1,000 effectives and the unit is accepted as withdrawn.

7 Parachute Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERDMANN) has not been encountered since 28 January. The western part of its former sector has been taken over by 47 Volksgrenadier Division while the eastern portion probably has become the responsibility of 10 SS Panzer Division. The withdrawal of 7 Parachute Division is accepted. As its commitment on Sixth US Army Group zone was short, its combat effectives are still estimated at 3,500. The division should be ready for action elsewhere on short notice.

c. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ)

(1) 172 Reserve Division is an upgraded division number with headquarters in HOMBURG. The division appears to have as a primary duty the responsibility of supplying replacements for line units of Army Group G.

(2) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army assumed a defensive attitude throughout period and made no appreciable changes in its front line positions. Extensive reorganization of its front line dispositions in the area of the HARDT Mountains to the RHINE River was carried out as 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, and 256 Infantry Divisions were withdrawn to the rear. 245 Infantry Division moved into line between 47 and 36 Infantry Divisions and 6 SS Mountain Division sidestepped to the west assuming responsibility for a large sector in the mountains. This afforded the enemy the opportunity to withdraw an additional division from this sector, 256 Infantry Division having been select.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLEIN)

416 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. PFLIEGER) is responsible for a sector from the Moselle to the area L 0501. Identification of 713 Regiment at L 0501 denotes a shift north into positions formerly held by 11 Panzer Division. 714 Regiment was last contacted at L 0504 on 27 January. Division combat strength is estimated at 3,500 as of 29 January.

719 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. SCHWALBE) is holding a long stretch from MERZIG to the SAARLAUTERN area. Last identifications were as follows: 723 Grenadier Regiment at Q 2881 on 1 February and 743 Grenadier Regiment at Q 2880 on 23 January. Strength was estimated at 4,000 on 29 January.

11 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. von WIETERSHEIM) was identified by its artillery elements on 1 February on XX US Corps front. However, lack of identification of either Panzer Grenadier Regiment since 27 January and the assumption of responsibility by 416 Division of its former sector would support the theory that the division has been withdrawn. A fair source reported that on 26 January one half of the division left for the eastern front. Latest estimate of divisional strength is 4,500 combat effectives including 50 tanks and self-propelled guns.

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) continues to hold the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to the vicinity of FORBACH (Q 3966). During the period only 861 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 29 January at Q 3273, and on 31 January at Q 3173. PW statements lead to the assumption that this is the only organic regiment remaining to the division, it having absorbed 860 Grenadier Regiment. The mission of the division remains purely defensive, with no replacements or any prospect of relief expected. Combat effectives of the division are estimated at 2,400, including 900 from 80 and 107 Grenadier Replacement Battalions (172 Res Div) and 514 Grenadier Replacement Battalion.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. BRITZELMAYR) holds the sector from FORBACH (Q 3966) to Q 6055. Identifications during the period include those of 59 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4960 on 27 January, and of 74 Grenadier Regiment on 29 January at Q 5359. 73 Grenadier Regiment has not been identified since 7 January and its present whereabouts are not known. Service personnel of the division have been identified fighting in line as infantry troops. The increased strength of 59 Grenadier Regiment would imply that it had received recent replacements. The division's combat strength is estimated at 1,700, including the 400 effectives of Battle Group KLEIN.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division (CG: SS Lt. Col. FICK) holds the sector Q 5955 to the BITCHE area (Q 7750). Light contact throughout the period identified 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 28 January at Q 6654; 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 28 January at Q 6653, and on 31 January at Q 5955. Prisoners of war from 38 Panzer Grenadier Regiment stated that their strength and positions had not changed considerably for three weeks and that no relief is expected. Regiment KENTNER (Battle Groups HARTIG and HELDMANN) left the line on 28 January as organic units of the division took over their sectors. Strength of the division is 2,000 effectives with about 20 self-propelled guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLEN) continues to hold the sector from Q 7450 to Q 7644. 1126 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on 29 January at Q 7445, while 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified on 29 and 30 January at Q 7450. 1125 Volksgrenadier Regiment has as yet not been contacted and there is no evidence of its having refitted. Only small scale actions have relieved the passive tenor of the division's role. Remnants of the 361 Volksgrenadier Division provided 300-350 replacements for 1127 Volksgrenadier Regiment. These bring the divisions total combat effectives up to 2,200, including 500 from the attached 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion and Battle Group ZWEIBRUCKEN.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(c) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. FRANZ) last identified 29 January the division is believed to have been squeezed out of line by the westward move of 6 SS Mountain Division and 36 Infantry Division. The low state of its effectives (1,600) and its continuous commitment through December and January should qualify it for rest and refit, but the present serious situation should force early recommitment in a relief or reinforcement role elsewhere on the Western front.

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL) now holds the sector from Q 7644 to Q 8138. Of its three regiments only 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment was identified, on 2 February at Q 7541, while 457 and 477 Volksgrenadier Regiments were last contacted on 24 January. PW's of 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment stated that 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment was to their left, with 477 Regiment in reserve. Organic strength in combat effectives is 1,500, plus 200 effectives in the attached 815 Heavy Machine Gun Battalion.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: SS Maj. Gen. BRENNER) moved westward taking over part of the former sector of 256 Volksgrenadier Division. It now holds from Q 8138 to Q 8631. 6 SS Reconnaissance Battalion was identified at Q 8137 on 31 January. 11 SS Mountain Regiment was contacted last at Q 8434 on 28 January; 12 SS Mountain Regiment on 2 February at Q 8631. The losses inflicted on the division caused one or more battalions to be withdrawn for refit behind the lines. Combat effectives are estimated to be 2,200 including 200 for 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion.

36 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELLM) shifted slightly to the west, now holding the line from Q 8631 to Q 9028. The extent of its sector was curtailed appreciably by the commitment of 245 Infantry Division. Neither 118 nor 165 Grenadier Regiments were identified during the period. 87 Grenadier Regiment was identified on 30 January at Q 8729. PW's confirm that I Battalion 87 Regiment is still at BAUMHOLDER while II Battalion is subordinated to 165 Grenadier Regiment. Divisional combat effectives total approximately 2,000.

(d) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOEHNE)

This corps is temporarily carried under command of First German Army. Prior to the offensive in the HAGUENAU area, LXXXIX Corps was directly subordinate to Army Group G for logistics and tactical reasons, while operating in this area. It is probable that the same situation will be repeated.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER). The presence of this division in the sector from Q 9028 to Q 9328 has been established by the identification of 937 Grenadier Regiment at Q 9228 on 30 January and of 935 Grenadier Regiment in the same area on 1 February. Initial interrogation of prisoners of 937 Regiment suggests that reorganization of the division during its long rest period was less extensive than had been anticipated. On this basis a strength of 3,000 would be the maximum.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. BORK) committed its third regiment, 115 Grenadier Regiment, during the period and now holds from Q 9328 to R 0025, though the withdrawal of 7 Parachute Division may well have forced the division to extend its sector east toward HAGUENAU. Identifications for the period were as follows: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 27 January and 1 February at Q 9328; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 31 January and 1 February at Q 9526; 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 29 January and 1 February at Q 9825. Combat effectives are about 1,500.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

10 SS Panzer Division (CG: SS. Brig. Gen. HARMEL) has been left with a considerably enlarged sector due to the withdrawal of 7 Parachute and 21 Panzer Divisions on its right and left flanks respectively. Its line now extends from west of HAGUENAU (R 0124) to BISCHWILLER (R 1020). Last identifications were of 21 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 2 February at R 0124 and R 0919; 22 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment on 1 February vicinity R 0920. Heavy losses during the previous period have been partially offset by replacements held in local reserve. Divisional strength has been reduced to about 2,800 effectives supported by approximately 50 tanks and assault guns.

d. ARMY GROUP OBERRRHEIN

(1) Army Oberrhein (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von MAUR)

(a) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. von dem BACH-ZELEWSKI)

353 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) has probably expanded north to take over part of the sector vacated by 21 Panzer Division. Its present boundaries are believed to be BISCHWILLER (R 1020) on the right and the RHINE River on its left. Contact during the past week was light, the only identifications being that of Battalion TREUTLER of Regiment MARBACH at R 1312 on 1 February. Combat effectives remain at 2,500 strong. It is understood that this formation is actually a division staff operationally controlling miscellaneous units temporarily assigned.

405 zbV Division continues to exercise administrative control over Volkssturm and garrison units in the SIEGFRIED Line along the East bank of the RHINE River from R 1107 to W 0018.

(b) XVIII SS Corps (CG: SS Lt. Gen. REINEFARTH)

30 SS Grenadier Division is still carried East of the RHINE in the general area between OFFENBURG and FREIBURG. It may well have the mission of assisting 405 zbV Division in holding defense positions along the East bank of the RHINE River.

(2) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. RASP)

The enemy defenses in the VOSGES Pocket failed to withstand heavy Allied pressure from the North and South. The troops of Lt. Gen. RASP were unable to prevent a developing pincers movement within the pocket and, in order to avoid complete annihilation, a withdrawal of men and equipment to the SIEGFRIED Line and Germany was started on approximately 1 February. Casualties in men have amounted to about 6,000 combat effectives during the period and loss of equipment has been proportionate. Two divisional units suffered extremely heavy losses; namely, 708 and 16 Infantry Divisions. No substantial reinforcements have arrived, indicating that the departure of this Army from France is imminent.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN) has suffered extremely heavy losses in attempting to stem Allied advances to the RHINE River in the vicinity of NEUF BREISACH. Complete concentration of the division was effected in the area of COLMAR, when elements previously in the MULHOUSE area moved North. The division arrived in the VOSGES Pocket much below T/O strength and was reinforced by elements of 5 Mountain Division and 4 High Mountain Battalion from Italy. The independent Battalion was absorbed by 137 Mountain Regiment, and 3 Company of 85 Reconnaissance Battalion by 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion. A further five companies of 5 Mountain Division, originally intended to serve as a cadre for a new mountain division,

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

were diverted to 2 Mountain Division. The division contains a large proportion of Austrian personnel who have proven themselves to be only mediocre troops. Up to the close of the period the division had yielded 2610 prisoners of war.

At the close of the period the division was operating in battle groups mostly in the areas of 198 and 189 Infantry Divisions. The division was originally given an estimated strength of 4,500 troops. However, the extremely heavy losses inflicted on the division suggest that the combat effectives do not now exceed 2,000 men.

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SCHIEL) managed to pull practically all its units out of the SELESTAT (V 7862) area before being cut off. A captured field order of 1 February has the division holding a sector from V 7741 to V 8141, flanked by 2 Mountain Division on its right and 189 Volksgrenadier Division on the left. The proposed lines of withdrawal for the division were in a south-easterly direction. Operationally attached to the division were 1 Battalion 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment (16 VG Div), II and IV Battalions 111 Mountain Artillery Regiment (2 Mtn Div), II Battalion, 1316 Artillery Regiment (16 VG Div), 993 GHQ Artillery Battalion, 2 Artillery Battalion, 1326 Fortress Artillery Battalion, I Battalion 14 AA Regiment, 501 AA Battalion, 2 Company 1316 A T Battalion (16 VG Div) and elements of 654 GHQ ATK Battalion. The existence of 235 Artillery Regiment, 198 Fusilier Battalion, 235 ATK Company, 235 Engineer Battalion, 235 Signal Battalion, 235 Field Replacement Battalion, and Supply Regiment were confirmed. The division, is estimated to have not more than 1,000 organic combat effectives.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. ZORN) was responsible for a sector west of V 7741. Though the western extremity of its sector is not known, 189 Division was responsible for the defense of COIMAR and vicinity. The presence of 1212 Grenadier Regiment, not identified since 28 December, is most doubtful. The regiment is believed either disbanded or detached. Last identifications of the other two regiments were: 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 1 February vicinity V 7442; 1214 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 2 February vicinity V 7242. Present organic strength of the division is estimated at 800 strong.

708 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. MUELLER) has been very badly depleted and is presently incapable of independent action. The regiments of the division have been disorganized and the remnants are operating in various battlegroups under the control of other divisions. A prisoner of war stated that the division trains crossed the RHINE River during the night of 31 January. Its remnants total approximately 500 combat effectives.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) was forced into the NEUF BREISACH area. However, some elements of 221 Volksgrenadier Regiment are still being contacted in the northwest sector of the pocket. The division is being constantly reported as having given up elements to other divisions and the identifications prove the scattered disposition of its units. Its strength does not exceed 500 effectives.

Miscellaneous Units in LXIV Corps Sector: The critical situation in this sector has produced the usual conglomeration of miscellaneous GHQ units, with compositions varying from paroled criminals to converted clerks of higher headquarters. This collection of bodies and odd types of arms is estimated to have increased the total number of combat effectives by a maximum of 1,500 men.

(b) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EWERT). During the beginning of the period commitment of the division remained rather obscure, with only 758 Grenadier Regiment identified at V 7011 on 28 January and at V 6813 on 1 February. On 2 February 757 Grenadier Regiment was identified west of COIMAR. However, the repeated sightings of eastward movement in the former divisional sector suggest that its withdrawal is nearly completed. Organic units total about 1,400 combat effectives.

DECLASSIFIED

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. DERNEN) continued to defend the approaches to CERNAY and ENSISHEIM. The divisional sector seems to have contracted in the east as elements of 716 Infantry Division were identified within the former's area. The division now holds from V 5216 to V 6212. Identifications were made during the period of the following units: 1209 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 29 January; 1210 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 27 January at V 5911; 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 31 January at V 5812 and on 2 February in the vicinity of V 5214. Prisoners state that the two original battalions of 1209 Regiment were consolidated into I Battalion and that 40 Panzer Grenadier Replacement Battalion was possibly renamed II Battalion, 1209 Grenadier Regiment. Organic strength is estimated at 1,200 plus 400 for attached units (201 and 202 Mountain Battalion, 808 Super Heavy Machine Gun Battalion, and 21 Mortar Battalion).

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) has expanded westward as indicated in the identifications of 726 Grenadier Regiment at V 6312 on 30 January. 736 Regiment remains unidentified, but a captured code name list of 15 January confirms its existence. 706 Regiment was last contacted at V 6713 on 1 February. Reinforcing the depleted division are 758 Grenadier Regiment of 338 Infantry Division, 785 Engineer Battalion, 2 Company 654ATk Battalion, possibly 40 PG Replacement Battalion, and elements of 106 Panzer Brigade. 726 Regiment is known to have received some replacements from 460 Replacement Battalion (ULM). Organic strength, 1,200 plus 600 in attached units.

106 Panzer Brigade. A prisoner has stated that the unit is to move from the vicinity of ENSISHEIM to the area south of COLMAR in order to cover the withdrawal of 189 Infantry Division. Its present strength in tanks and men is much depleted, as it fought very stubborn battles in the south. Total strength is 500 men supported by 15 tanks and self-propelled guns.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	25,000	*
First French Army	10,000	**

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	13,000	
First French Army	4,000	**

Reserve:

Estimate Reserves in Saar	7,500
Estimate Reserves in Black Forest	12,000

TOTAL	71,500
-------	--------

Tanks and SP Guns

Seventh US Army	80-100
First French Army	40- 50

TOTAL	120-150
-------	---------

(*) Sharp drop due chiefly to withdrawal of 21 Panzer, 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute and 256 Volksgrenadier Divisions.

(**) Strength rapidly decreasing as a result of casualties and withdrawals.

DECLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

The ranks of 5 Mountain Division in the Alpine sector have again been reduced to provide further reinforcements for 2 Mountain Division in the COLMAR Pocket. However, the strength of nominal Alpine units on this front remains the same, as elements of 5 Mountain Division continue to be identified and ground sources report some influx of other mountain units as replacements into the VAL di SUSA. The only indication of any further weakening of the German units comes in prisoner of war statements that approximately one battalion of Italian troops is distributed among regiments of 34 Infantry Division. Ground sources have not confirmed the report that the general evacuation of PIEDMONT, ordered to begin on 10 January, has actually started.

b. Enemy Strength

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult. It is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

The French First Army attack continued its successful push in the Southern VOSGES Sector against stiffening opposition. The enemy established numerous strong-points with armor support and installed extensive minefields to aid the defense. The heavy fighting which had taken place in CERNAY region subsided by the end of the period.

The unabated drive on the northern flank of the VOSGES Pocket brought our forces well along the COLMAR Canal by 27 January, but the enemy at that time was concentrating remnants of his armored units on the west bank of the ILL River, probably preparing a more aggressive defense. At GRUSSENHEIM (V 8147) his resistance was extremely stiff, but to the west the town of HOLTZWILHR (V 7646) was taken in stride and no contact was reported with the enemy by patrols which reached the canal junction at V 8545. East of the ILL River from SELESTAT to KRAFFT the enemy also remained out of contact.

Thus, the panhandle in the north was successfully cleared by 1 February, as friendly elements reached the Rhine River. Throughout that part of the front, resistance was negligible.

The bitter opposition and armored counterattacks met early in the period in the drive on COLMAR slackened after HORBOURG (V 7448) was finally cleared. Similarly, the capture of ARTZENHEIM (V 8546) materially reduced the strong resistance which small enemy groups had put up in the HARDT woods. The end of the period saw steady advances being made in spite of the mines, snow, and obstructions encountered all along the front. COLMAR was taken 3 February, but some fighting continued at isolated points. Enemy activity in the rear areas continued to be reported in the form of heavy movement from this area to the south and southeast. This was explained by PW statements to the effect that troops, supply trains, and artillery were evacuating through the NEUF BRISACH area.

The enemy proved himself very alert in the RHINE bridgehead area throughout the period. Our forces found BETTENHOFFEN and GAMBSHEIM clear, but the position from OBERHOFFEN to the road junction at R 0910 was an enemy strongpoint which put up stubborn resistance supported by 8 - 10 tanks. East of BISCHWILLER, he appeared to be entrenching at critical points. The flooding of this area proved to be an obstacle of major proportions at the close of the period, as friendly forces reported water to be waist-high at some points.

The enemy's attitude was definitely defensive in the sector from HAGENAU to the HARDT Mountain area where his principal activity was digging defences north of the Moder River. Scattered resistance, with some tanks, was met in the HAGENAU Forest, but steady vehicular movement to the rear was reported.

REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8037) in the HARDT Mountain area was found unoccupied and from that point to the eastern edge of the mountains, no report of enemy contact was received. Further westward, however, the enemy was digging in and reacting to our patrols with mortar and self-propelled gun fire.

The relative quiet in the SAAR remained unbroken except for one minor probing attack in the area of WOELFING (Q 5955), which caused some withdrawal of friendly forward elements. No contact was made in the area from EPPING URBACH (Q 6957) to the BITCHE Forest but the movement of small enemy groups was observed, probably effecting local reliefs.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

Observations made during the period revealed a very definite trend of enemy withdrawal along the Sixth Army Group Front. In the Vosges Pocket vehicular movement to the south and east as well as reports of crossings of the Rhine by barge and ferry indicate a further reduction of enemy forces in the pocket. Along the KARLSRUHE - OFFENBURG - FREIBURG line heavy rail activity was reported, although not very much actual movement was visible. Heavy military activity was also seen in the MANNHEIM-KARLSRUHE - HEILBRONN area, consisting of approximately 25 - 30 military trains reported on 29, 30 January, and 2 February. The SAAR was likewise active with considerable road and rail activity along the WISSEMBOURG - LANDAU - GRUNSTADT (M 3107) lines, and also in the KAISERSLAUTERN - HOMBURG - PIRMASENS area.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

East of the Rhine the rail lines converging upon HEILBRONN revealed heavy traffic whenever a break in the weather permitted good visibility. Indications are that the bulk of this activity was movement headed in an easterly direction, thus pointing to a departure either of military units from our front or of troops from the large training camps in the PFORZHEIM - STUTTGART area.

Large scale movements of motor transports in a northeasterly direction along the WISSEMBOURG - LANDAU roads on 29 and again on 31 January, confirmed the conclusion that the withdrawal of enemy forces was underway. This conclusion is supported by the fact that on 2 February, 5 military trains were seen moving north and east on the LANDAU - GRUNSTADT (M 3107) rail line, and another military train eastward from the vicinity of BIEBERMUHLE (Q 9083).

In the Saar large concentrations of locomotives, rail and flat cars, were reported in the sidings and marshalling yards along the KAISERSLAUTERN - HOMBURG line. Photo reconnaissance and TAC/R revealed a total of 8 - 9 trains along the line on 29 and 30 January. One of these trains, hauled by 4 engines, consisted of 15 probable light AA wagons. Reconnaissance of 2 February revealed four additional trains moving west along this line.

It is of interest to note that many of the military trains seen throughout the period were made up in part of flat cars loaded with motor vehicles. Moreover, much of the activity seen in the marshalling yards, especially in the SAAR Region, consisted of large numbers of flats loaded with vehicles. As many as 100 - 150 of these loaded cars were seen at NEUSTADT and another large number at ALZEY (M 2828). A comparative study of the week's movements reveals that rail and road activity was heavier and more pronounced than at any other comparable period during the past month.

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

INCLOSURES

- Inc # 1 - APPENDIX "A"
- Inc # 2 - Ordnance Depots
- Inc # 3 - The Rhine Bridges
- Inc # 4 - Enemy Disposition

DISTRIBUTION

"Special"

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A" TO SUMMARY NUMBER 20 DATED 3 FEBRUARY 1945

PANZER BASE CENTER

A Panzer Base is a center where unserviceable armored force vehicles are reconditioned or replaced, and where new or repaired armor and spare parts await collection by field units. Thus, a Panzer Base comprises workshops, spare parts depots, offices, and storage facilities which may be spread over a considerable area. Of the three Panzer Bases located on the western front, two are in the Sixth Army Group area: Panzer Base Center, near KAISERSLAUTERN (R 0094); and Panzer Base South, near PFORZHEIM (R 7133).

The headquarters of Panzer Base Center is now at OTTERBACH. Installations in the immediate vicinity which may be a part of the Base are shown on Enclosure #1. It will be noted that the road and rail nets are adequate, and that installations are widely enough dispersed to render complete destruction unlikely. A workshop company is located in OTTERBERG, repairing tanks and motor vehicles in buildings on both sides of the road leading to OTTERBACH.

Additional repair facilities are available at SIEGELBACH, where normally dense natural cover has been artificially thickened to provide concealment for a camouflaged workshop tent 60 meters long, and for a small wooden shack which serves as an office building. A report of 19 December 1944 mentions vehicles parked under the trees beginning at the north edge of the woods, and extending south in a single line along either side of the road. Approximately 20 tanks and 40 - 50 trucks were reported ready for use, in addition to the vehicles under repair. Later information reveals another large tank, truck and repair point just northeast of KAISERSLAUTERN at R 049952, not shown on Enclosure No. 1.


Winterizing equipment for armored vehicles is available at the HOHENECKEN depot, and further supplies at EINSIEDLERHOF, where a large ordnance depot, reported in September, may still be functioning. A very large ordnance depot just east of KAISERSLAUTERN, at R 060945, is housed in six large storage buildings, and eight sheds. It is a major installation served by five railroad spurs and a good roadnet. It was bombed on 30 December, but damage appears so slight that the installation is probably still functioning. Spare parts are stored at FRANKENSTEIN, where an underground wine cellar, built 60 meters deep into the side of a hill, is used as a depot for replacement motors, tracks, and other spare parts for Pz Kw III, IV, and V. Conveniently at hand is the tank factory at NIEDERFELS, a 1 1/2 story building at the south end of town, between the main highway and the railroad tracks. Pz Kw III and IV bodies, and Pz Kw III, IV, and V, motors are constructed here.

Only little is known about Panzer Base South. A PW taken on 11 December located a tank spare depot called Panzer Base South in a former cellulose factory at MALSCH (R 430324), west of PFORZHEIM. Parts for all types of armored force vehicles are stored there. Photo interpretation and ground information of 20 January 1945 confirm this statement. Much track activity and vehicles parked in the area tend to confirm the report that this is a tank and motor transport repair depot.

Other ordnance installations in the immediate vicinity of the present 6th Army Group Front Lines are shown on Enclosure No. 2.


DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED



G-2 6th ARMY GROUP
ENCL. #1 TO
WEEKLY INTELL.
SUM. # 20
AS OF 3 1200 A FEB.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED



AS OF 3 1200 A FEB.

ORDNANCE
DEPOTS

KEY

- MAIN ORDNANCE DEPOT
- BRANCH ORD. DEPOT
- ORD. DEPOT UNSPEC.
- ▭ PANZER BASE
- ▭ BRANCH PANZER DEPOT
- TANK FACTORY

SCALE: 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.



190/720 45/640 6040

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

6TH ARMY GROUP
ENL #2 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. # 20

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

THE FIRST FRENCH ARMY SECTOR



THE RHINE BRIDGES

—• CONDITION —•

DAMAGED /
DESTROYED X


—• KEY —•

- PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE

**3 1200 A FEB.
ENCL.#3 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL.SUM.#20
G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP**

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 31200 A FEB.

SCALE: 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

190/FEB 45/640 6041

DECLASSIFIED

G-2 6TH ARMY GROUP
ENCL. 4 TO
WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. 4 20

DECLASSIFIED

MIRS (L) PTH
EB 6 Feb 2

P 487

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

82

By Auth of :
CG, 6 Army Group :
Initials: WCH :
Date: 27 Jan 45 :
:

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 19

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 27 JANUARY 1945

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

The enemy organization along the Sixth US Army Group front has been clarified.

Army Group G controls the front from the Moselle through approximately the WISSEMBOURG - HAGUENAU road. Under it the First Army operates through the following corps: LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divs); XIII SS (19 Inf, 17 SS PG, and 559 VG Divs); XC Infantry (257 VG, 256 VG and 6 SS Mtn Divs); LXXXIX Infantry (245 Inf, 47 Inf and 36 Inf Divs).

Army Group OBERRHINE includes the operational Nineteenth Army in the COIMAR pocket, the administrative defence command known as Armee-Gruppe OBERRHINE (possibly Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army), and the XXXIX Panzer Corps. The subordinate units in the pocket remain unchanged, except for the replacement of 269 Infantry Division (identified on the Russian front) by 2 Mountain Division. The administrative role of XIV SS and XVIII SS Corps has been confirmed by agent reports and some documentary evidence. XXXIX Panzer Corps has conducted the operations in the HAGUENAU-RHINE area with 25 Panzer Grenadier, 7 Parachute, 10 SS and 21 Panzer Divisions under command, as well as those units in the GAMBSHEIM area controlled by the staff of 553 Division.

The offensive power of the enemy has definitely diminished along the front. West of INGWILLER, there has been practically no offensive action. On the contrary, an excellent agent source reported various defensive preparations already in effect. Both 719 and 347 Infantry Divisions have been absorbing reinforcements from 172 Reserve Division's various units, while 19 Infantry was forced to recall its errant unit from the HARDT. Any reinforcements received by 17 SS were necessary to permit the spread of this battered formation, whose original combat efficiency was depreciated by its captured commander. Nor can the divisions in the HARDT be held in higher esteem, with the possible exception of 6 SS Mountain, whose losses from a second surrounded battalion are revealing both poor tactics and even poorer quality personnel.

East of the HARDT the enemy has by no means achieved a success worthy of his announced intentions and the units delegated for the operation. The aggressive actions were in the nature of probing attacks, searching for the weak point where his armor might be effectively used. In addition terrain factors forced him to canalize his efforts along routes which were obvious and easily controlled. This indecision was prolonged to the point where extremely bad weather and events on the other fronts decided the issue for him. By the end of the period the enemy's offensive intentions were no longer possible of execution.

In the VOSGES pocket the enemy was reduced to shuttling his units to meet attacks from north and south. Commitment of mobile formations in the south was followed by a parcelling out of the reserves, when even 2 Mountain Division was found operating on both sectors. A distinct lowering of the quality of forces in the CERNAY sector set in early, while even the enemy's better troops were having extreme difficulty holding well prepared defensive positions in blizzards propitious for such an intention.

DECLASSIFIED
BY 15 Jul 72
ON 15 Jul 72

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

As for strategic reserves, there were none identifiable along the whole Sixth US Army Group front. 361 Infantry Division was in fact cannibalized, while its staff retired to Germany. 47 Infantry Division, hardly an impressive unit, had to be brought in from the northern front and was committed immediately after a road march from LANDAU to HATTEN. 245 Infantry Division was approaching the lines in an obviously relief capacity. 2 Mountain Division drew part of its complement from 188 Reserve Division in Austria and 5 Mountain Division on the Italian Alpine front. 30 SS, according to prisoners from another unit, was in such a demoralized condition that the enemy did not dare to use it, for fear of mass desertion. Finally, documentary evidence for the presence of II SS Corps is completely discounted, as merely the rough draft of a plan whose temporarily pregnant possibilities never achieved fruition.

In sum, the enemy has lost the initiative.

b. Capabilities

1. From the Moselle to the Rhine:

(a) to attempt to stabilize the front, withdrawing if necessary to the successive positions along the Moder, the Maginot Line, the Siegfried Line. The high cost of his present operations, the inability to use armored formations efficiently under actual terrain and weather conditions, definite indications of their withdrawal, the preparation of defensive positions with a subsequent economy of forces and the lack of contact for some days combine to make this capability the most favored.

(b) to defend east to the HARDT and carry on his attempt to recapture STRASSBOURG. Bad weather and energetic resistance have successfully thwarted any serious enemy advances with heavy losses to his present strength. The turn of events on other fronts has deprived him of the reinforcements necessary for further progress. This capability is not favored.

2. In the COLMAR pocket:

(a) to reinforce and attempt to maintain his present lines. Here again reinforcements are lacking and available strength is being depleted to a point where manpower earmarked for the Siegfried Line is being drawn upon. The present defensive position running from MULHOUSE through CERNAY, along the VOSGES and then the canals to the Rhine, is being forced and will fall under determined attacks. The danger to the Nineteenth Army of a sudden breakthrough from north and south cannot be underestimated by the enemy. Finally, the cessation of active operations in the HAGUENAU area makes no longer imperative the necessity to keep occupied a large part of the Allied forces. The possibility of an eventual intention to break out against STRASSBOURG from the BENFELD area is no longer considered. This capability is not favored.

(b) to retire in good order into the Siegfried Line after having completed the establishment of a bridgehead position in the NEUF BRISACH area. A retreat into the Siegfried line would permit an economy of forces now necessary to the enemy, releasing some for use in the HAGUENAU area eventually. Gruppe von OPPEN has already been identified making ready the ancient fortress area of NEUF BRISACH, under exactly similar circumstances to those prevailing earlier at BELFORT. Such a position would effectively deny use of the Rhine valley to the Allies and serve to protect the vital east bank communication lines for the enemy. This capability is favored, particularly in conjunction with 1 (a) above.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing 6th Army Group were as follows: VOLKLINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLINGEN (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), HAGUENAU (R 0424), BISCHWEILER (R 0919), HOERDT (R 0410), KILSTETT (R 0808), South along the Rhine to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), SELESTAT (V 7862), JEBSHEIM (V 8147), LE VALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), CERNAY (V 5811), WITTENHEIM (V 7012), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to the Swiss Border.

b. ARMY GROUP G (CG: Gen. BLASKOWITZ)

(1) First German Army (CG: Lt. Gen. OBSTFELDER)

The First Army failed, during the period, to make any appreciable changes in its front line, excepting on its left flank which moved forward to the line of the Moder River. 47 Volksgrenadier Division is a new arrival in the area and was first contacted to the West of HAGUENAU. However, the cannibalizing of 361 Infantry Division offsets the above new unit, with 256 Infantry Division receiving the lion's share of its remaining effectives. The role of 172 Reserve Division with headquarters at HOMBURG continues to be the same: namely to provide replacements for divisions actively engaged in line. This division constitutes the only known reserve for the army.

(a) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOERNLIEN)

347 Infantry Division (CG: Maj. Gen. TRIERENBERG) continues to hold the sector from SAARLAUTERN (Q 2982) to the vicinity of FORBACH (Q 3966). Identifications of elements were made by Sixth Army Group's left flank neighbor: 347 Fusilier Battalion, and 347 Artillery Regiment at Q 2981 on 21 January. Due to the extremely light contact during the period it is believed that the enemy's losses were negligible. Its strength is estimated at 2,400 combat effectives including 900 combat effectives from 41 Fortress Engineer Battalion, 80 and 107 Grenadier Replacement Battalions (172 Res Div), and 514 Grenadier Replacement Battalion.

(b) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division (CO: Col. BRITZELMEYER) holds the sector from FORBACH (Q 3966) to Q 5956. The only identification of subordinate units during the week was 59 Grenadier Regiment at Q 4662. This indicates the return of the regiment to its parent unit from control of 559 Infantry Division. Combat strength of the division is estimated at 1,600, including the attached Battle Group KLEIN with 400 effectives.

17 SS Panzer Grenadier Division extended its sector slightly to the east and is presently holding the line from Q 5956 to the BITCHE area (Q 7750). 37 Panzer Grenadier Regiment was identified at Q 7353 on 25 January after being absent for over two weeks. The regiment is believed to have been completely reorganized after suffering extremely heavy casualties during its earlier attacks. Col. LINGNER, captured Commanding General of the division, revealed that the division had no organic or attached tanks but did have 28 X 75 mm assault guns on 3 January. The present strength is 2,000 effectives with about 20 SP guns.

559 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. von MUEHLER) continued to hold the line between Q 7550 - Q 7643 passively. The present existence of 1125 Grenadier Regiment is very doubtful as no identification of the unit has been made since its destruction in December. The only unit contacted was 1126 Grenadier

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Regiment on 23 January. Some replacements were received during the period, presumably making up for any losses suffered. Combat strength including Battle Group ZWEIFRUCKEN, Battle Group HELDMANN and 58 Fortress Machine Gun Battalion, totals 2,000 men.

(c) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. PETERSEN)

257 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. SEIDEL) has been holding the quiet sector between Q 7443 and Q 7738. The following identifications were made during the period: 457 Volksgrenadier Regiment on 22 January; 466 Volksgrenadier Regiment, on 22 January Q 7442; 257 Engineer Battalion, 22 January Q 7441. Division strength is 1,500 effectives.

256 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. FRANZ) moved forward after the US forces withdrew to new positions in the HARDT Mountains. The line now extends from Q 7738 to Q 8336. Reported identifications were: 476 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 24 January Q 8137; 481 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 7937. 456 Volksgrenadier Regiment has not been contacted since 14 January. Although 256 Infantry Division received the bulk of the 4-500 remaining effectives of 361 Infantry Division, the division strength is still depleted. The combat effectives total 1,600 men, including 400 effectives in 38 German Air Force Battalion and 815 Super Heavy Machine Gun Battalion, which are still believed attached to the division.

6 SS Mountain Division "Nord" (CG: Maj. Gen. BRENNER) in moving eastward during the present period sidestepped 256 Infantry Division and assumed responsibility for the sector between Q 8336 and Q 8632. One battalion of 12 SS Mountain Regiment was surrounded and decimated at Q 8430. The following identifications were made during the period: 11 SS Mountain Regiment, 24 January Q 8534; 12 SS Mountain Regiment, 25 January Q 8530. No replacements are known to have arrived and, on the basis of the casualties suffered, the strength of the division is now estimated at 3,000 effectives, including the satellite 506 SS Panzer Grenadier Battalion.

(d) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HOEHNE)

36 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. WELIM). The sector held by this division runs from Q 8632 to Q 9544. Identifications: 87 Grenadier Regiment, 23 January Q 9027; 118 Grenadier Regiment, 23 January Q 8830; 165 Grenadier Regiment, 24 and 25 January Q 9544. Organic units now number approximately 2,300 effectives.

47 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Gen. BORK) is the new arrival from Northwest Germany. The division was first identified West of HAGUENAU on 23 January, but PW's claim that the division was previously committed in the HATTEN area on 16 January. It has the sector from Q 9328 to Q 9726. The identifications are: 103 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 24 January Q 9728, and on 25 January at Q 9626; 104 Volksgrenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 9726. 115 Volksgrenadier Regiment is as yet unidentified. The division appears to have been despatched to this area without any loss of time or extensive reorganization. Its combat effectives total only 1,500 men.

245 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. KEGLER) was moving forward into line, according to a reliable source. The last identification by contact was made on 15 January when prisoners were taken from 937 Grenadier Regiment in the US 45 Infantry Division zone. Other prisoners taken on 21 January placed the command post at ERLENBAACH (R 0957). There were indications that this formation, whose organic strength is estimated at a minimum of 3,000, would supplant one of the divisions eligible for withdrawal.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(a) Army OBERRHEIN (CG: SS Lt. Gen. von MAUR)

(a) XXXIX Panzer Corps

25 Panzer Grenadier Division (CO: Col. BAUMEISTER) closely followed our withdrawal from the HATTEN area and after a slight delay was committed in operations to cross the Moder River. Its remaining offensive power was utilized to reinforce 7 Parachute and 47 Infantry Divisions, with which it operated as combat teams. Identifications: 35 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January R 0025; 119 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January Q 9627. Its maximum strength is 1,500 combat effectives plus 20 tanks and SP guns.

7 Parachute Division (CG: Maj. Gen. ERDMANN) committed only 21 Parachute Regiment during the period, but there are indications that 19 and 20 Parachute Regiments followed it into the area Northwest of HAGUENAU. The bulk of the division was previously in the GAMBSHEIM bridgehead area. It is now holding a sector from Q 9726 to R 0425. Interrogations indicate that the battalions were 400-450 strong at the time of initial commitment. However, 21 Parachute regiment suffered heavy losses on the Moder River. Present strength of the division is 3,700 effectives.

10 SS Panzer Division (CO: Col. HARMEL) is crammed into a short sector east of HAGUENAU (R 0425 to R 0820). Both regiments (21 and 22 PGR's) were identified at R 0622 on 25 January. This denotes a shift to the west and a switch with 21 Panzer Division in the lineup. At time of commitment, battalion strength was approximately 350. Total combat strength at present is believed to be around 3,500 men, supported by 65 tanks and assault guns.

21 Panzer Division (CG: Maj. Gen. FEUCHTINGER), mentioned above in the switch with 10 SS, was located on a relatively long front from R 0820 to R 0511. Identifications are as follows: 125 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 24 January R 0713; 192 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 25 January R 1018. The division is in a weakened state and, in spite of some replacements, its strength is estimated at 1,600 combat effectives, supported by 40 tanks and SP guns.

(b) XIV SS Corps (CG: SS Maj. Gen. von dem BACH - ZELEWSKI)

553 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Brig. Gen. HUETEKER) is merely a divisional staff controlling a heterogeneous collection of units rapidly assembled from convalescents, over-age and reserve personnel on the East bank of the Rhine. The extent of its sector is not known but it has its left flank on the Rhine at R 1107. The combat effectives of the division are estimated at 2,500 men but the calibre of the troops is very low.

Recent interrogations indicate the composition of the division to be as follows:

Regiment MARBACH (3 Grenadier Regiment OBERRHEIN)
Battalion SCHMIDT, Battalion TREUTLER, Battalion ZIERES (ex I Bn E/V Regt), Battalion MORG, (6 Bn OBERRHEIN), II Battalion 2 SS Police Regiment.
Regiment HOELSCHER
Battalion KAPPES (ex I Bn 1119 VGR), Battalion MEYER, Battalion MOELLER, I and III Battalions 2 SS Police Regiment, Police School HEIDENHEIM.
Regiment von LUETTICHAU
REICHSFUEHRER Escort Battalion, Battalion WIMMER.

405 zbV Division still controls static units along the East bank of the Rhine from R 1107 to W 0018.

(c) XVIII SS Corps

30 SS Grenadier Division. A prisoner states that the Germans do not consider the division suitable for combat because of the tendency of large numbers to desert.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(2) Nineteenth Army (CG: Lt. Gen. WIESE)

The Nineteenth Army continued its stubborn defense of the VOSGES pocket and maintained its combat effectives at 17,000. The recent arrival of 2 Mountain Division into the area is offset by the withdrawal of 269 Infantry Division. 269 Infantry Division has been claimed by the Russians on the Eastern front.

(a) LXIV Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. HELMUT THUMM)

198 Infantry Division (CG: Brig. Gen. SCHIET). 308 Grenadier Regiment was identified at V 7750 on 25 January and there are other indications that the division is being operated in pieces south of its old sector north of SELESTAT. The unit strength is estimated to be 1,500 plus 500 combat effectives for the attached 56, 192 and 746 Engineer Battalions.

708 Infantry Division (CO: Col. MUELLER) was contacted in almost its entirety north of COLMAR. The divisional sector extends from V 6846 to V 7646, with support rendered by 16 Volksgrenadier Division. Losses for the present operations have totaled approximately 400 effectives. Thus, the present combat effectives of the division total 1,000 men.

16 Volksgrenadier Division (CG: Maj. Gen. HAECKEL) has been committed in the area northeast of COLMAR, on 24 January, thus shortening the sector of 708 Infantry Division. The division was last identified in the Western VOSGES on 30 December. Identifications: 223 Grenadier Regiment, 26 January V 7645. The division has received some replacements. The numerical strength of the unit, approximately 1,200, is a result of the absorption of numerous miscellaneous unaffiliated units.

2 Mountain Division (CG: Brig. Gen. DEGEN), traced through Norway and Denmark during recent weeks, was first identified by French I Corps on 22 January. So far the following identifications have been made: 136 Mountain Regiment, 26 January V 8147; 111 Mountain Artillery Regiment, 26 January V 7646; 55 Mountain AT Battalion, 26 January on French II Corps front; 82 Mountain Engineer Battalion, 26 January on French II Corps front; 67 Mountain Reconnaissance Battalion, 25 January V 7348. Elements of the division were committed almost immediately upon arrival in the MULHOUSE area, and later in the period, the bulk of the division joined the battle in the COLMAR sector. The division is organized as a standard mountain division and its combat effectives are estimated at 4,500. There are indications that reinforcements from 5 Mountain Division, in addition to the already identified 4 High Mountain Battalion, may be expected.

189 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. ZORN) 1213 Volksgrenadier Regiment, the only unit to be identified during the period, was located at V 6148 on 21 January. This does not indicate any change in the divisional sector. The division is slightly to the west of our attack and combat effectives are still believed to be about 1,000 plus 500 attached.

(3) LXIII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. ABRAHAM)

338 Infantry Division (CO: Col. EWERT). The major change is the identification of 758 Grenadier Regiment north of MULHOUSE on 24 January, as 757 Regiment and the Anti-Tank Battalion were still identified in their old sector in the vicinity of V 5018. It is believed that 758 Regiment was detached to aid 716 Infantry Division which suffered heavily in the French I Corps attack. PW stated that Colonel von OPPEN was relieved by Colonel EWERT. With no reported replacements, strength is still estimated at 1,600.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

159 Volksgrenadier Division (CO: Col. DERNEN) was in close contact from V 5117 to V 6610 where it resisted stubbornly throughout the week. 1209, 1210, 1211 Volksgrenadier Regiments were all identified in that sequence from south to north on 21 through 24 January. PW's of 1211 Regiment stated they were reinforced recently by 111 Mountain Replacement Battalion, but casualties (of 1209 in particular) exceeded these replacements. Strength, including the attached 201 Mountain Battalion, is 1,500.

716 Infantry Division (CO: Col. HAFNER) is now definitely established as being back in line, holding from V 6610 to the Rhine V 8300. It is of interest to note that the division has added a third infantry regiment, 706. It is composed of the former Battalions VOGEL, NIEDERMEYER (56 Repl Bn), and BEUCHELT (14 Repl Bn) of the BAUMGARTNER Regiment of the old HAFNER Brigade. Major BAUMGARTNER's Regiment became one of the organic elements of the division. 726 Regiment, now virtually destroyed, is composed of the previously identified Battle Groups KEMPE, EMMENDORFER and MAERKER. 736 Regiment was not identified and its whereabouts are not known. The division took a bad beating in its determined defense against the 9 Colonial Division and it is now supported by 758 Regiment of 338 Division; I Battalion 137 Mountain Regiment of 2 Mountain Division; 654 Tank Destroyer Battalion; and 4 High Mountain Battalion. The identification of the latter deserves particular attention as it came from the Alpine front where it had operated under 5 Mountain Division. Organic strength of 716 Division is estimated at not more than 1,300.

106 Panzer Brigade. One Company (armored reconnaissance) was identified on 25 January at V 6609. This is a shift from the northern to the southern side of the VOSGES perimeter. Location of other companies of the brigade is not known. Tanks possibly belonging to 106 Panzer Brigade were supporting counterattacks at various points of the Pocket. Strength is placed at 700 men, with 25 tanks and SP guns.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	35,000
First French Army	17,000

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	18,000
First French Army	5,000

Reserve:

Estimated reserve opposite Seventh US Army	5,000
Estimated reserve in Black Forest	10,000

TOTAL	90,000
-------	--------

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh US Army	165-180
First French Army	65- 90

TOTAL	230-270
-------	---------

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGULLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020) GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTGENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

Although no change in enemy disposition has been reported, there are indications that elements of 5 Mountain Division may be withdrawn from the Alpine Front. The appearance of 4 High Mountain Battalion in the COIMAR pocket and lately PW statements indicating that elements of 5 Mountain Division are now under 2 Mountain Division suggest that the garrison of the Alpine Front may lose some of its complement.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

The lack of positive information on the strength of Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but it is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000, with 60% carried as combat effectives.

4. OPERATIONS

The attack by the French First Army in the THANN-MULHOUSE area on 20 January achieved initial surprise. Progress was steady until vicious counterattacks by 716 Infantry Division supported by elements of 2 Mountain Division and 106 Panzer Brigade, with extremely heavy artillery fire, stopped the forward surge at the cost of heavy losses in both men and materiel. Successful repulsion of the enemy counterattacks was followed by a resumption of the slow advance against a motley collection of reinforcements which manned the prepared defensive positions. At the close of the period our forces were approaching CERNAY (V 5812) and WITTELSHEIM (V 6312). Throughout the week operations were hampered by continuously bad weather, with blizzard conditions mounting.

The attack northwest of COIMAR began under adverse weather on 23 January. The initial effort carried across the ILL river after the capture of some bridges before destruction was possible. Enemy counterattacks regained the river line and permitted occupation of pillboxes and hastily dug positions controlling the approaches to the COIMAR and Rhone-Rhine Canals. By the end of the period the enemy was being forced back across the COIMAR canal south of HOLTZWIER (V 7146) after having yielded JEBSHEIM (V 8047). Resistance to the Allied attack was initially fierce, but showed signs of diminution at the end of the week.

In the Rhine bridgehead, enemy attacks toward WEYERSHEIM (R 0513) marked the beginning of the period. However, a change of dispositions resulted in a buildup west of HAGUENAU. The main attack was launched on 25/26 January in an all out effort to gain crossings of the Moder river. The Allied lines were pierced temporarily, but the situation was immediately restored. By the end of the period contact was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain.

SP and artillery fire marked the early days of the week in the WIMMENAU-REIPERTSWILLER (Q 8036) area. A slight withdrawal of Allied forces followed at ZINSWILLER (Q 8935) on 22 January. Battalion strength attacks and infiltration tactics led to temporary enemy occupation of ROTHBACH (Q 8433). Local attacks continued, particularly at MUHLHAUSEN (Q 8532) and SCHILLERSDORF (Q 8430), both of which were eventually cleared. The SAMR sector was relatively quiet throughout the week. Artillery fire from heavy guns hit SAMRALBE (Q 4845) sporadically.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. TAC/R

During the current week aerial reconnaissance was greatly hampered by bad weather and poor visibility. The limited observations which were made revealed little rail movement except for the unusual activity observed in the Saar along the KAISERSLAUTERN-LANDSTUHL line on the 26th of January. East of the Rhine in the Black Forest area, some rail movement in a general southeasterly direction was noted on the OFFENBURG-DONAUESCHINGEN line and light to moderate activity was observed in the yards at APPENWEIER, OFFENBURG, LAHR (W 1071), and GENGEBACH (W 2079), on 23 January. On 24 January a concentration of 500 railroad cars was observed at BOTZINGEN (V 9942) on the rail line leading to BRISACH, while across the Rhine in the COLMAR pocket, no rail movement was seen, although considerable vehicular activity was reported heading southward toward ENSIHEIM and SULZ (V 6220).

The presence of 20 trains plus a concentration of 1000 boxcars on the sidings in the KAISERSLAUTERN-LANDSTUHL area reported on 26 January, reveals a movement capable of carrying a major military unit into the Saar region. The fact that 500-700 vehicles were seen just south of this area on 23 January, and that considerable vehicular activity took place in this sector on the 22nd, is further circumstantial evidence that indicates the possible arrival of an equivalent division in our area.

Extensive road activity was also reported in the rear area east of WISSEMBOURG and in the vicinity of LANDAU possibly representing the southward movement of supplies in that region. In the vicinity of FRIESTETT (R 1508) groups of tanks and motor transport totalling approximately 40-50 tanks and 50-75 vehicles were reported on 20 January. In connection with these concentrations it is of interest to note that the enemy has 6 dismantled pontoon bridges at prepared sites to cross the Rhine in this area between STRASBOURG and WINTERSDORF (R 2727). One report specifically states that the pontoon bridge at DRUSENHEIM (R 1618) is capable of carrying tanks across the river.

B. STATUS OF COMMUNICATIONS

Adverse weather conditions which prevailed throughout the week not only hindered observation but also made it practically impossible for Allied aircraft to launch successful attacks upon the enemy's communication system. This lull in aerial activity afforded the Germans a welcome opportunity to repair any cuts and to rebuild their rail transportation net as is evidenced by repairs to the now serviceable ELLER (L 5767) and NONNWEILER (L 4612) bridges in the Saar.

Photo cover of 23 January shows that sufficient damage to the BULLAY rail and road bridge (L 5761) continues to render it temporarily impassable and that the north railroad bridge at BAD MUNSTER (M 0835) is also believed to be still unserviceable.

Photo interpretation reports reveal that the Germans have approximately 43 Rhine crossings available between STRASBOURG and MANNHEIM. Three of these are fixed combination rail and road bridges and a fourth is the rail bridge at GERMERSHEIM; the rest are pontoon bridge and ferry crossings. South of STRASBOURG, there are 27 suitable crossings sites, 15 of which are believed to be in actual use, the status of the remaining 12 being unknown. Except for the rail bridges of BRISACH and NEUENBURG, (which can also be used for motor transport traffic) these crossings are either of the pontoon bridge or ferry type.

6. DEFENSES

No new trends have developed in the organization of enemy defenses in the last few weeks.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

The main activity has consisted of the consolidation of the communication and fire trenches connecting the pillboxes and casemates of the Siegfried Line. This is in keeping with the standing order of defending these strongpoints from the outside and permitting retreat to adjacent installations. This work seems to have reached a high state of completion throughout the Sixth US Army Group Front.

Double and triple lines of continuous fire trenches have been developed in the area KEHL-KAISERSSTUHL, several kilometres behind the bulk of the Siegfried concrete defenses. These trenches are interconnected around towns, forming perimeter defenses. This would indicate that the order to turn each town into a strongpoint is being applied.

New air cover continues to reveal additional pillboxes and casemates which heretofore had not been observed, thereby gradually increasing the density of known defenses in the Siegfried Line. This is particularly true between BASLE and KEHL where the entire Rhine Plain to the foothills of the Black Forest can be considered as an organized defense area, although the concrete works do not approach the high density found nearer the Rhine.

Lack of air cover, due to weather, precluded observation of any German defensive activity between the present front line and the Siegfried Line in our northern sector.

7. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

German Frequency Induction Igniter

From documentary evidence, it has been known for some time that the German Army has been experimenting with frequency induction igniters.

The igniter is used to detonate S-Mines. One igniter is placed for every ten S-Mines, and employs an electric circuit. The purpose of the igniter is to prevent the use of electric mine detectors. It functions on the same wave length, and when the detector approaches the igniter, the waves are picked up by a coil antenna. They are transmitted to the relay which closes the battery circuit, thus firing the mines by means of electric detonators.

The sensitivity of the igniter is such that it will be detonated by any strong wave sent out in its vicinity.

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

APPENDIX

APPENDIX "A" - Weather Conditions in Upper Rhine Valley for February.

2. INCLOSURES

- Inc. #1 - The Rhine Bridges.
- Inc. #2 - Enemy Disposition.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "A"

WEATHER CONDITIONS IN UPPER RHINE VALLEY FOR FEBRUARY

GENERAL

February is the most favorable winter month for military operations in this area. Rainfall reaches the lowest level for the year and cloudiness is slightly less than at any time of the year except summer. Temperatures, though slightly higher than in January, remain below freezing for considerable periods, assuring a firm foundation for cross-country movement in many localities. In the air, cloudiness drops off and visibilities improve over the preceding months, providing an increased number of operational days for tactical air support. In all, February presents better weather conditions than either of the two preceding months or the two spring months to come.

TEMPERATURE

The mercury begins to rise in February. Averages are, in general, two to three degrees above those for January. Only at elevated points does the mean remain below the freezing point. Colmar, with a mean of 36.9 degrees shows the highest average, while Grand Ballon in the High Vosges returns the lowest February mean of 24.9 degrees. Valleys points, such as Strasbourg, Mulhouse, and Karlsruhe, enjoy a mean of 35 degrees. The highest temperatures ever registered in this area for the month fall in the high sixties, while below zero marks are still possible. Colmar once recorded -8.3°. In an average February the mercury will rise to a maximum of 55 degrees and drop on the coldest day to a low of 10 degrees. To the east of the Black Forest slightly lower temperature prevails: Donaueschingen has 28.0° and Munich 29.0°.

FEBRUARY MEAN TEMPERATURE

Belfort	35.2	Baden Baden	35.0
Saverne	35.1	Freudenstadt	30.0
Strasbourg	35.1	Stuttgart	36.0
Grand Ballon	24.6	Ulm	31.0
Nancy	35.8	Augsburg	32.0
Metz	36.0	Freiburg	36.0
Sarreguemines	35.2	Karlsruhe	35.8
Mulhouse	35.2	Basle	36.0
Donaueschingen	28.0		

PRECIPITATION

February is the driest month of the year. Often a northeasterly circulation prevails for many days, bringing cold, dry air from the Great Russian Plains. Elevation and exposure are the chief determining factors in the rainfall pattern. Again the amounts received vary considerably in adjacent localities.

Valley locations, in general, receive less than two inches. New Breisach has a mean of 1.20 inches and all points in the Rhine Valley floor and Alsatian Plain have less than 1.60 inches. Similar figures obtain also in the Bavarian Plain with Donaueschingen in the rain shadow of the Black Forest, receiving only 1.20 inches. Further east there is a slight rise (Munich 1.9 inches), but nowhere does the amount exceed 2.0 inches. The Vosges and Schwarzwald show almost double and triple the rainfall of the valleys. Averages as high as 5.6 inches are reached at Ruhstein and Todtmoos in the High Schwarzwald. Even the hill country on either side of the Saar provides sufficient elevation to catch additional moisture. East of Trier the average rise to 3.2 inches and in the Harz Mountains to 2.4 inches.

Snow cover reaches its maximum depth in late February. It is entirely dependent on altitude. At Strasbourg the average February snowfall amounts to only 0.8 inches and the greatest depth ever measured on the ground was 5.9 inches. Mountain stations in the Vosges and Schwarzwald report considerably greater depths. Feldberg in the Black Forest has an average February fall of 60 inches and a mean snowcover of 103 inches. Snow will measure somewhat deeper on Eastern slopes than on western. In the mountain passes of the Vosges and Schwarzwald snow drifts may form a serious obstacle to the movement of military traffic.

DECLASSIFIED

MEAN FEBRUARY PRECIPITATION

Besancon	2.3 inches	Frankfurt	1.3 inches
Metz	1.5	Freudenstadt	4.7
Strasbourg	1.3	Nurnberg	1.1
Basel	1.5	Munich	1.3

CLOUDINESS AND MOISTURE

Cloud cover in the Rhine Valley, though less than in January, continues to be considerable. Karlsruhe at 0800A has overcast conditions 57 percent of the mornings. The figure falls to 49 percent by noon and to 48.5 percent by 1900A. Thus, the sky may be expected to be overcast 50 percent of the time. Clear skies will prevail 20-25% of the time at Karlsruhe. Similar conditions are found over much of the area with mountain locations in the Vosges and Schwarzwald reporting slightly higher percentages of cloudiness.

Relative humidity is high. Southwesterly winds predominate and this brings moisture-laden winds from the Atlantic. Strasbourg shows an average morning relative humidity of 88 percent and a noon figure of 76 percent. These high figures prevent rapid drying, though occasionally this regime is broken when cold, dry winds sweep out of Russia and brings spells of very dry conditions.

VISIBILITY

Visibility in the Rhine Valley is generally poor throughout February. Obstructions to vision in the form of precipitation, smoke, haze, or fog are present most of the time. At Karlsruhe visibility is better than 6 miles at 0800A only 27 percent of the time, and is below 2½ miles 51 percent. There is a marked improvement in the morning hours, as over 54 percent of the noon observations show better than 6 miles. After sunset a rapid deterioration sets in. Often periods of very poor visibility tend to persist for several days. A haze layer settles near the ground, obscuring both horizontal and vertical sight. Sometimes however, the plateau regions west of the Vosges and east of the Schwarzwald are not affected by this haze layer which tends to settle over the Rhine Valley.

WIND

The prevailing wind over the entire area is Southwest. This flow is emphasized by the contours of the Rhine Valley tending north and south. 41 percent of all wind observations at Karlsruhe are from the Southwest and Strasbourg shows 43 percent from South and Southwest. The second most frequent direction at Karlsruhe is Northeast with 20 percent, while Strasbourg tends to North and Northwest with 24 percent. All other directions occur less than 10 percent. Calms exist at Karlsruhe 8.2 and at Strasbourg 15 percent of the observations. Wind speed is low. A general average of 7-8 mph. prevail over the entire area. Gales (Over 32 mph.) are seldom experienced, probably less than once a February.

WIND DIRECTION

	<u>N</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>SE</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>SW</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>NW</u>	<u>Calm</u>
Strasbourg	11	4	2	2	12	31	10	13	15
Metz	8	14	3	3	8	16	10	4	34

SOURCE:

Weather Officer - XII T A C

DECLASSIFIED

SUNRISE AND SUNSET TABLES FOR FEBRUARY, 1945
Strasbourg 48 35N 07 45E 500 feet elevation

<u>FEBRUARY</u>	<u>SUNRISE</u>	<u>SUNSET</u>	<u>MOONRISE</u>	<u>MOONSET</u>	<u>PHASE</u>
1	0758	1728	2150	1006	FULL MOON
2	0757	1730	2253	1030	
3	0755	1731	2356	1050	
4	0754	1733	----	1111	
5	0753	1734	0059	1129	LAST QUARTER
6	0752	1736	0205	1159	
7	0750	1738	0310	1231	
8	0748	1740	0416	1330	
9	0746	1741	0519	1359	NEW MOON
10	0745	1743	0617	1459	
11	0743	1744	0707	1610	
12	0741	1746	0747	1731	
13	0740	1748	0826	1848	
14	0738	1750	0853	2010	
15	0736	1752	0921	2130	
16	0734	1753	0947	2250	
17	0732	1755	1013	----	FIRST QUARTER
18	0730	1756	1040	0008	
19	0728	1758	1111	0126	
20	0727	1759	1148	0239	
21	0726	1801	1231	0347	
22	0724	1803	1321	0448	
23	0722	1804	1419	0540	
24	0721	1806	1520	0623	
25	0719	1808	1625	0659	FULL MOON
26	0717	1809	1730	0710	
27	0715	1811	1835	0752	
28	0713	1812	1939	0815	



For Civil Twilight subtract 37 minutes from sunrise and add 37 minutes to sunset.

All times are "A" Army Time or 15 Degrees East Time.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

THE FIRST FRENCH ARMY SECTOR



THE RHINE BRIDGES

—• CONDITION —•
DAMAGED /
DESTROYED X

—• KEY —•

- PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- COMBINATON HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE

27 1200A JAN
ENCL. #1 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #19
B-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET



RECEIVED BY THE SEC
JAN 11 1984

DECLASSIFIED

MIR (S)

P 448

59

HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

By Auth of :
CG, 6 Army Group :
Initials: *2.1.45* :
Date: 20 Jan 45 :
:

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 18

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 20 JANUARY 1944

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION


a. Organization of the German Command.

Enemy control of units facing the Sixth US Army Group is clear, except for the subordination and composition of XXXIX Panzer Corps.

Army Group G at through at least the First Army encompasses the front from the Moselle through WISSEMBOURG on the north. There is some evidence for the acceptance of von BLASKOWITZ and General der Infanterie Hans von OBSTFELDER as the relative commanders. The corps under command include LXXXII Infantry (11 Pz, 416 Inf, 719 Inf and 347 Inf Divisions); XII SS Corps (19 Inf, 17 SS PG and 559 VG Divisions) XC Corps (257 VG, 256 VG, 36 Inf and probably 6 SS Mountain Divisions); and LXXXIX Corps (245 Inf Div).

Army Group OBERRHEIN under HIMMLER functions in an operational capacity through the Nineteenth Army in the COLMAR pocket, with LXIV Corps (198 Inf, 708 Inf, 189 VG, 16 VG and possibly 269 Inf Divisions) and LXIII Corps (338 VG, 159 VG and 716 Inf Divisions) as subordinate echelons. Its administrative function as a defense command is exercised through Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN (which may equate with a reported Twenty-third or Twenty-fourth Army similar to the Twenty-fifth Army in HOLLAND) under General der Artillerie and SS Obergruppenfuhrer Heinrich von MAUR. The subordinate echelons are 14 SS and 18 SS Corps, controlling replacement training units, police and Volkssturm in the area east of the RHINE.

The subordination and composition of the higher command controlling the offensive operations west of the RHINE between WISSEMBOURG and the southern limit of the bridgehead is open to question. 245 Infantry Division, the only divisional unit known definitely to be subordinate to LXXXIX Corps, has had practically no role in the present operation. 21 Panzer and 25 PZ Gr Divisions are known to be operating in conjunction in what is termed Operation Feuchtinger, named obviously after the Nazi favorite and panzer general last identified in command of 21 Panzer Division. 7 Para Division, whose arrival was evidently the signal for the beginning of the operation, committed only elements of its 20 Para Regiment at HATTEN. 19 and 21 Para Regiments crossed the RHINE into the bridgehead and are presently in contact there. The initial crossing was made by elements of 553 VG Division, which was directly controlled by 14 SS Corps. It was von MAUR, signing himself as Oberbefehlshaber der Armee-Gruppe OBERRHEIN on 5 January, who addressed the following to the units of his command: "I place my full trust and all my hopes in you so that in a few days I am able to report to the Fuehrer: The Swastika flies once again from the Strasbourg cathedral" On 13 January HIMMLER's congratulatory message to the troops in the bridgehead was signed in his capacity as Oberbefehlshaber der Heeres-Gruppe OBERRHEIN. On 19 January the Reichsfuehrer's Escort Battalion was identified in the bridgehead. Finally, the identification of XXXIX Panzer Corps provides the higher tactical unit capable of controlling the offensive units already active in the area and the newly-arrived 10 SS Division.



REGRADO

DECLASSIFIED

BY

ON

29 AUG 1946

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

b. Capabilities and Discussion.

The actual use and subordination of the offensive units concerned (the Reichsfuehrer's Escort Bn, 21 Pz, 25 Pz Gr, 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions), undoubtedly the strongest units on the whole Sixth US Army Group front and three of which were obviously brought in for the operation, determines not only the enemy's capabilities, but also his intentions in this area. The following capabilities may be listed.

1. To stabilize the front from the Moselle to the HARDT Mountains, with spoiling attacks against the Allied bridgehead at SAARLAUTERN and holding attacks in the vicinity of the major cities. The low number and poor quality of the troops in the area makes the execution of this capability imperative and purely defensive in character. 11 Panzer Division does not represent sufficient offensive power to permit the enemy more than an aggressive defense and the possible employment in this area of salvaged remains from the ARDENNES diminishes as the Allied counteroffensive gathers momentum. Finally, there is no evidence of other reserves which the enemy's previous costly failures along the western edge of the HARDT Mountains must have taught him were necessary to make any venture profitable.

2. To defend the COLMAR pocket, the Allied attack launched in the MULHOUSE area has robbed the enemy of any offensive capability he may have had in the southern sector. In the northern sector of the pocket, it has been established that the enemy's intentions were limited to the establishment of a main line of resistance on the ILL River. A reliable officer PW has stated that operations northward from the VOSGES pocket were intended to be only diversionary in character, with the main effort to be directed against STRASBOURG from the north.

3. To attempt to capture STRASBOURG. Again the number and quality of troops does not permit execution of a capability allowed the enemy before 1 January, that of capturing SAVERNE and the entire ALSACE plain. Coordinated drives south from the eastern HARDT and through the HAGUENAU forest, east against SAVERNE from the RHINE, and northeast against MOLSHEIM would all be necessary. Without increased reinforcements, the enemy is not capable of meeting all the requirements for such action. However, the capture of STRASBOURG would serve not only to maintain the initiative, but also as an extremely valuable morale factor within Germany. The excessive political tinge of the higher commands, the expressed intentions of the enemy in this area, and the obvious determination to gain some advantage from a poorly conducted military campaign into which good troops are now being thrown after the bad, lends some weight to the possibility that the operations are being controlled by Army Group OBERRHINE. A southward shift of units from HATTEN through the newly established corridor to the GAMBSHEIM area would be even more convincing evidence that XXXIX Panzer Corps has been provided with the best units at the disposal of the Army in order to save the Party's prestige. If HITLER could not enter ANTIWERP, HIMMLER must at least take STRASBOURG.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

a. At the close of the period the front lines of enemy forces opposing 6th Army Group were as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 6555), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), DUMBACH (Q 9245), CLEEBOURG (R 1145), ROESCHWOOG (R 2225), DRUSENHEIM (R 1518), East of WEYERSHEIM (R 0713), South along RHINE to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LEVALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE NAPOLEON (V 7408), E along the HUNINGUE Canal to NIFFER (V 8201), South along RHINE to Swiss Border.

b. FIRST GERMAN ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORF)

The importance which the enemy has attached to this front after the failure of his ARDENNES effort has been very noticeable of late particularly in his propaganda broadcasts. More concrete results of this attitude were revealed in the arrival of two major units (7 Para Div and 10 SS Pz Div) during the current period opposite the Seventh US Army. His reserves in this area at present are in a depleted state. There is one located division (172 Res Div) which could possibly be committed and one body

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

mauled division (561 VG Div) which although identified at the beginning of the previous period has not been contacted since that time and is presumed to have been withdrawn into local reserve.

Originally a mobilization division of Wehrkreis XII, 172 was upgraded to a Reserve Division. At present, it appears to provide reinforcements for the units opposing the Seventh US Army. Its static role is evident from the list of the units identified as having been under its control prior to commitment: 35 Observation Bn; 41 GAF Fortress Bn; 58 Fortress MG Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 87 Repl Bn; 107 Gren Repl Bn; 282 Stomach Bn; BG HARTIG; BG FRIDMAN; BG KLAMPFAYER; EINHEIT KLEIN; BG WIESBADEN and BG ZWIBRUCKEN.

(1) LXXXII Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. WALTER HOERNLEIN)

347 Infantry Division displayed no sign of any change in its passive attitude and no identifications were made of any of its units during this period. Organic strength: 1,500; attached units: (41 Fortress Engr Bn; 80 Repl Bn; 107 Repl Bn; 514 Repl Bn) approximately 900, for a total of 2,400 combat effectives.

(2) XIII SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. MAX SIMON)

19 Infantry Division was also inactive and no identifications were made during the period. In addition, contact with its element (59 GR) in the HARDT Mountain sector has not been firm since 15 January. Organic strength: 1,500; attached units: 300; for a total of 1,800 combat effectives.

17 SS PG Division came into prominence late in the preceeding period when the Commanding Officer SS Colonel HANS LINGNER was captured while on a personal reconnaissance. Subsequent interrogation has revealed that the capacity of the unit is fairly low, in his estimation. During the period, 38 SS PGR was identified, but the lack of contact with 37 SS PGR tends to confirm the theory that it was badly mauled and is refitting in the rear areas. All factors considered, combat effectives are estimated at about 2,400 and (20-30) tanks or SP guns.

559 VG Division had 1136 and 1137 VGR's still in line on 12 January in a sector which has taken on a purely defensive color. The continued lack of identification of 1135 VGR since the attack started is perhaps accounted for by PW statements that the regiment was disbanded and has not been reconstituted. Including BG ZWEIBRUCKEN, 58 Fortress MG Bn and BG HELDMANN effectives are estimated at 2,000.

(3) XC Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. (LV) PETERSEN ?)

257 VG Division stubbornly resisted our efforts to take ground in the southeastern corner of the HARDT Mountain salient and undoubtedly sustained some losses. After 466 VGR was contacted on 14 January, the subsequent identification of 477 VGR and 457 VGR on the 15 and 19 January respectively definitely limited the division's sector. Considering the action in which it has participated, the strength of the division is estimated at 1,500 combat effectives.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord continued during the early part of the period to play a major defensive part along the critical southern edge of the HARDT salient. P's stated that the Arty Regt had some batteries refitted with 105 mm gun howitzers in place of the former 75 mm mountain howitzer. Further PW statements revealed that new uniforms and weapons had been issued to the unit while in Denmark. During this period elements of 12 and 11 SS Mountain Regiments were identified on 12 and 19 January respectively. Incomplete contact, therefore, makes it appear that while some units remain in line, the major part of the division has been pulled back into what would be conservatively termed local reserve. The strength of the division is at least 4,000 combat effectives.

256 VG Division shifted from the east flank of the HARDT salient down to the southeastern corner where it appears to have taken over at least part of the front formerly held by 6 SS Mountain Division. Although completely on the defensive all three VGR's were identified during the period. Total combat effectives including attachments (39 GAF Bn and 815 Super Heavy MG Bn) are no

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

36 Infantry Division appears to have been definitely committed in the pivotal position on the east flank of the HARDT salient where both 118 GR and 165 GR put in an appearance during the period. 87 GR has been unidentified since 2 January. The accounting for the rest of this division as refitting in rear areas is, in part, supported by PW statements that the reason for our identification of only one battalion of each regiment on the day of the initial attack was that the other battalions were refitting in BAUMHOLDER. Organic units are estimated at 2,800 combat effectives with an additional 300 in the 51 GAF Bn and the 81st Super Heavy MG Bn.

(4) LXXXIX Corps (CG: Gen. HOEFNE)

245 Infantry Division has been lightly contacted of late. 937 GR was identified in the sector northeast of WISSEMBOURG while available information indicates that attached units (XII/I Regt and 52 GAF Bn) have the responsibility for the sector between the two vital attack areas. That the division remains in the area is supported by the PW statement that the division CP is located in the SIEGFRIED Line at R 1756. Organic strength: 3,500; attached units: (XII/I Regt and 52 GAF Bn) approximately 700, making a total of 4,200 combat effectives.

(5) XXXIX Panzer Corps

(Note: Subordination of units to this and XIV SS Corps is still in doubt)

21 Panzer Division continued to fight fiercely in the area of HATTENRITTERSHOFFEN and sustained heavy losses in these engagements according to PW statements. It was also stated that the operations were called "FEUCHTINGER" which would indicate either that 21 Panzer division controlled more than its own units in the battle or that its Commanding Officer has been given control of a higher tactical unit. A single large replacement battalion is reported provided 4-500 men for the division, with 300 additional troops being sent to a pool in WISSEMBOURG and the balance to 25 PG Division. Considering the activities engaged in during the period it is reasonable to assume that the infantry effective strength of the division is about 2,000 and that organic tanks and SP guns number approximately 50.

25 PG Division experienced the same heavy fighting as the 21 Panzer Division under whose control it may have operated during the period. Both 35 PGR and 119 PGR were identified on 19 January but the tank battalion has not been positively contacted since 11 January. The 4-500 replacements received recently will help to offset the heavy losses suffered by the division in the HATTEN area. It is estimated that the division has 2,000 combat effectives supported by 30 tanks or SP guns.

7 Para Division had its three Para Regiments identified on 17 and 18 January. First elements of the division were located in the vicinity of HATTEN on 14 January after its arrival from HOLLAND. Route of approach appears to have been; VENLO; (the end of December); to HANNOVER-ERFURT-HEILBRONN with crossings of the RHINE being made at KARLSRUHE and GERMERSHEIM thence to LANDAU and NEUSTADT. The evidence suggests a strong infantry division of nine battalions and an artillery regiment of three battalions. Some of the vehicles are known to be wood-burning. At the close of the period one regiment (20 Para) appeared to have been detached for duty in the HATTEN area while the other regiments were in position along the west bank of the RHINE. Organic units are estimated to have a combat effective strength of about 4,500.

10 SS Panzer Division first gave evidence of its location by the capture of a 17 year old Sergeant in the bridgehead area on 19 January. The division had never been identified in the ARDENNES salient and hence had over one month in which to be refitted in manpower (reported to be 90% GAF) and equipment. The division appears to have moved by road from SAARBRUCKEN-NEUNKIRCHEN area via ZWEIBRUCKEN-PIRMASENS-BERGZABERN then to the east bank of the RHINE opposite the bridgehead. Elements of 21 SS PGR and 22 SS PGR were identified by the close of the period. The division has at least 4,500 combat effectives plus 80 tanks and SP guns.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

(OBERRHEIN)

a. XIV SS Corps (CG: Maj. Gen. SS v.d. BACH-ZELEWSKI)

No additional information has been received which would suggest that this corps controls any units other than 553 VG Division in the RHINE bridgehead. Its role is in any case assumed to be largely administrative.

553 VG Division had none of its organic units identified during the period but PW's continued to refer to its command responsibilities in the area. The regiments appear to have emphasized their already motley tone by absorbing various miscellaneous units. For example, BG KAPPES, is now 1st Bn 119 VGR; 1120 VGR equates with Bn HOPPE and Bn STURMLINGER. Information is scarce on the composition of 1121 VGR. Thus far, it is only possible to estimate the strength of committed units at 5-600, while the attached units (2 SS Police Regt; Bn MEYER; Bn OBERRHEIN and Regt E/V) increases the total to about 1,000 effectives.

405 zbV Division is still controlling a large number of static replacement and defense units along the east bank of the RHINE, stretching at least from R 1107 to W 0018. Whether it is still directly subordinated to Wehrkreis V or now under one of the new higher echelons in the area has not been settled. Its function, however, has not changed.

(2) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

LXIV Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division appeared to have been satisfied with its diversionary effort during the preceding period. Its subsequent conduct was hardly indicative of offensive intentions. 308 GR was the only regiment identified during the period (15 January). There was evidence however, that some 500 replacements were recently received by the division and by this amount the previous estimate of combat effectives is increased to 2,000 including attached units (192 Engr Bn; 56 Fortress Engr Bn and 746 Engr Bn).

106 Panzer Brigade has not participated in front line activity since 8 January at which time it was identified northeast of SELESTAT. Therefore careful attention must be paid to ascertain its zone of future commitment. Combat effectives are still carried at about 800 with an estimated 30 tanks or SP guns.

269 Infantry Division has not clarified its status since the close of the last period. At that time, only the 13th Company of 469 GR was identified. PW's have stated that the front in the COLMAR area is rather thinly held by 198 Infantry Division and attached units. The length of time during which this unit has been refitting suggests a new role, with the possibility that it may move to another front. Pending more confirmation combat effectives of the division are carried at 2,000.

189 VG Division appeared to have increased its regiments to 3 in number as 1214 VGR was identified on 14 January. Previously 1214 VGR had been reported absorbed by 1212 VGR but now it seems to have been reorganized from under-terminated sources. Organic strength: 1,000; attached units approximately 800, making a total of 1,800 combat effectives.

708 VG Division also eluded identification during this quiet period. The 728 VGR is assumed to be refitting for it has not yet been identified this month. Combat effectives including attached units are estimated to amount to 1,800.

16 VG Division finally came out of the unidentified column (after one Month) as elements of 221 VGR turned up on 16 January. PW said that the regiment was reorganized from Regt JACKER and Bn WASTER. Based on last known identifications and the fact that some refitting must have taken place, combat effectives should number in the vicinity of 1,000.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRESKOW)

338 Infantry Division drew attention to itself only by a slight shift to the northwest in the quiet VOSGES sector as 759 GR was identified on 18 January. Strength estimate is unchanged at 1,600 combat effectives.

159 VG Division continued its lull in the southwest corner of the pocket as no identifications were made during the period. Conservative strength estimates of the division would be 1,800 total combat effectives.

716 Infantry Division remains a very large question mark, although a deserter stated that the division CP was at KUENHEIM V 8542 in early January. This same deserter in relating his past stated that he arrived in the VOSGES pocket with FELDSTREP Battalion 15 (COLMAR), which unit was absorbed into one of the regiments of 716 Infantry Division. Then in compliance with an order dated 11 December, this division was absorbed by 708 Infantry Division, whereupon his unit became I/748 GR. It therefore appears that 708 Infantry Division has absorbed the troops of 716 Infantry Division, but not the staffs of the division. Therefore, if a regimental staff of the division appears in any sector it may forecast the absorption of the motley formations in the area into a new 716 Infantry Division. There is sufficient evidence to accept such a possibility as an accomplished fact in the HARTH forest area where the connections between 716 Infantry Division and the various units of Brigade HAFNER have become increasingly more frequent.

BRIGADE HAFNER. Miscellaneous Battle Groups identified on 15 January approximate 1,000 in combat effective strength.

d. ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	38,000
First French Army	17,000

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	18,000
First French Army	5,000

Reserve:

Units available in Black Forest	15,000
Reserve opposite Seventh US Army	5,000

T O T A L : 98,000

Tanks and SP guns:

Seventh US Army	200-240
First French Army	70-100

T O T A L : 270-340

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period the enemy front lines opposite the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine Front were as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MOLANE (K 4132), M TEBOR (K 3022), AIGUILLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

a. Enemy Disposition

No change in enemy dispositions and attitude.

b. Enemy Strength Sixth US Army Group Front (Alpine Front)

The lack of positive information on the strength of the Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000 with 60% carried as combat effectives.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

4. OPERATIONS

Having extended the COLMAR Pocket to include the area bounded by the RHINE and ILL Rivers during the previous period, the enemy satisfied himself with aggressive patrolling actions and harassing fire in the region North of SELESTAT. However, he managed to gain a small bridgehead over the ILL River in the vicinity of BERFIELD (V 9075) which he still maintains. Within the pocket proper the enemy made a few sorties in the area northeast of COLMAR, in the region west of THANN and in the HARTH Forest. All attacks were unsuccessful.

The Germans successfully maintained their positions in the Rhine bridgehead from dug in positions along the railroad N. of HERRLISHEIM (R 1315) during the early part of the period and on 16 January launched an infantry attack supported by tanks from OFFENDORF (R 1312) to the north, enabling him to reach the NE outskirts of HERRLISHEIM. From these positions he maintained a strong defense with small arms, mortar and machine gun fire while further reinforcements were being carried across the RHINE by barges.

The "MAGINOT Corner" was the scene of an intense enemy effort through out the period as counterattacks utilizing tanks and flame-throwers led to house-to-house fighting in both HATTEN (R 1733) and RITTERSHOFFEN (R 1634). Balked in his break-out attempts, the enemy utilized fresh troops and armor to join with the bridgehead further south as he took STATTMATTEN (R 1921), DEMGOLSHEIM (R 1821), and for a short time, SESSENHEIM (R 1921). The tempo of his efforts was increased, resulting in the recapture of SESSENHEIM and the woods in the vicinity. Smoke screens and camouflage aided his troops in gaining the line of pillboxes in vicinity R 1734.

Infantry in dug-in positions offered strong resistance in the HARDT Mountain zone near ALTHORN (C 7540), BUEHN (C 8039) and REIPERTSWILLER (C 8036), holding US troops to minor gains. However, the enemy mounted a few small-scale attacks in the HARDT Mountains attempting to cut roads in the areas (C 7639 and C 7738) by means of infiltration tactics.

Chief activity in the SAAR area during the period has been that of trains carrying pontoons in the W half of the zone, and of vehicle movement in area C 4064 - 5066.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

A. TAC/R

The enemy continued to reveal little rail activity during daylight hours, but it was apparent that two major rail movements were being completed early in the past week; one in the LANDAU - NEUSTADT sector, and the other in the SAARBRUCKEN - NEUNKIRCHEN - HOMBURG - PIRMASENS AREA. Increased activity was also noted on the lines about BAD KREUZNACH. In the Black Forest from VILLINGEN and DONAUESCHINGEN toward OFFENBURG and northward, some military activity was apparent on all days available for observation. Some southward movement in the direction of OFFENBURG from the north was also reported. Unimportant activity was observed in both the FREIBURG and COLMAR areas. The Germans continued to display a willingness to move vehicles on main roads close to the front during hours of daylight. However, some of these moves were probably forced upon him as a direct result of the numerous cuts effected on his parallel rail lines in the rear of forward positions.

The identification of medium tank trains, large numbers of flats (some loaded with motor transport) and groups of boxcars on the lines between RASTATT and OFFENBURG substantiated the view that a

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

military move took place early in the week into this area, chiefly from VILLINGEN and KARLSRUHE. The substantial vehicular movement in the area north of OFFENBURG on 18 - 19 January is at least partially connected with the arrival of 10 SS Panzer Division.

Within the Vosges Pocket and in the FREIBURG area very little rail activity was noted. However, it was clear from the fresh tracks converging into the Illwald Forest, that these woods concealed a fair amount of armor.

The FRANKFURT, DARMSTADT, MANNHEIM, and NEUSTADT rail lines were active on 14 January and the marshalling yards of WORMS, MANNHEIM, and GERMERSHEIM were all one-half full. This rail activity appears to have been connected with the movement into the NEUSTADT - LANDAU area.

The ending of a large scale related movement into the NEUSTADT - LANDAU area apparently took place on 14 January. The weather permitted reconnaissance over the area on only 13 and 14 January, but on these days 13 trains were sighted, as well as a large number of flats loaded with tanks and motor vehicles. The appearance of scattered groups of boxcars on most station sidings between WORMS and KARLSRUHE on 15 January suggests that the cars were being shunted about prior to collection for distribution.

Loadings in the yards and in small stations on the lines about SAARBRUCKEN, HOMBURG, NEUNKIRCHEN, and PIRMASENS, on 14 - 15 January took on added importance with the sighting of 3 medium tank trains plus some 150 loaded flat cars. In addition, TAC/R sighted large groups of tanks in the area during this period. This movement appears to have started in a northeasterly direction. At PIRMASENS, the trend of road movement on the same day also appeared to be toward the east.

B. ATTACKS ON RAILS.

Enemy rail communications in the Saar area bounded by the Rhine and Moselle Rivers were subjected to intensive air attacks. Approximately 80 cuts were effected during the week, but due to inclement weather, the enemy had had sufficient time to make repairs. The cuts do not appear to have caused any serious delays, but the inconveniences were no doubt annoying. The sealing in of a tunnel on the NEUSTADT - KAISERSLAUTERN line temporarily prevented through traffic, and photos of 14 January show that most of the BAD MUNSTER rail bridge has been destroyed, thus preventing uninterrupted movement between BINGEN and NEUSTADT.

C. FERRY CROSSINGS

The Germans are employing a total of at least 15 ferries along the Rhine between RHEINAU (V 984681) and RHEINWEILER (V 846012) in order to provide more ample means of communication with the Vosges Pocket. In general, night use appears to be much preferred.

At least two types of ferry are in actual operation, one capable of carrying 4 - 5 trucks, and the other a cable ferry guided by a steel cable strung across the river. The Germans also maintain much pontoon bridging equipment in the vicinity of these sites.

The following is a detailed list of known crossing sites showing the location and type, where specifically identified:

RHEINAU (V 984681)
SCHONAU (V 941571)
SASBACH (V 898498)
JECHTINGEN (V 883468)

GEISWASSER (V 915311)
NAMBSHEIM (V 895270)
BALGAU (V 885252)
NEUENBURG (V 859129)

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

BALTZENHEIM (V 880440)
KUHNHEIM (V 878420)
BRISACH (V 885360)
HOCHSTETTEN (V 896346)

*STEINENSTADT (V 850075)
*BILLINGEN (V 860036)
*RHEINWEILER (V 846012)

* Cable Ferry

Eugene L. Harrison

EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2

DISTRIBUTION
"Special"

2 INCLOSURES



Incl - #1 - The Rhine Bridges

Incl - #2 - Enemy Disposition

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

THE FIRST FRENCH ARMY SECTOR



THE RHINE BRIDGES

—• CONDITION —
DAMAGED /
DESTROYED X

—• KEY —


- PERMANENT ROAD BRIDGE
- FLOATING ROAD BRIDGE
- RAIL BRIDGE
- FERRY BRIDGE
- COMBINATION HIGHWAY-RAIL BRIDGE

ENCL.#1 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM.#18
G-2 SIXTH ARMY GROUP

20 1200A JAN.

DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

DECLASSIFIED



SCALE: 1/1,000,000

0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.

190/JAN 145/6AG 6034

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
ENEMY DISPOSITION
AS OF 20 1200 AJAN

U.S. SIXTH ARMY GROUP
ENCL 2 TO
G-2 WEEKLY INTELL. SUM. #18

DECLASSIFIED

P 408

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH US ARMY GROUP
Office of the A. C. of S., G-2
APO 23, U. S. Army

SECRET

By Auth of

CG 6 Army Group

Initials:

Date: 13 Jan 45

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NUMBER 17

FOR THE WEEK ENDING 13 JANUARY 1945

1. GENERAL

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation

Elements of thirteen divisional formations were still in contact on the Seventh US Army front at the beginning of the period. By the end of the week, active contact was being maintained only with the more aggressive units. Of these only 17 SS PG, 6 SS Mountain, and 36 Infantry Division showed marked sensitivity, while 21 Panzer, 25 PG, 256 VG and 553 VG were evidently using the temporary lull in the HAGUENAU area to gather strength for an attack. An increase in movement toward this area indicates the imminent arrival of reinforcements. There is definitely a need both for infantry and for armor if the enemy intends to press home his avowed purpose of freeing ALSACE. Continuous ground reports and movement tabulations make 10 SS and 7 Para Divisions the most likely of the candidates for this front, now that 711 Infantry Division has been identified on the Eastern Front and 11 Panzer seems to be moving closely behind the front in the MERZIG-SAARBRUCKEN area.

On the First French Army front, the 106 Panzer Brigade and all of the eight divisional formations except 16 VG Division were identified during the week. Reinforcements were still arriving in numbers sufficient to allow an increase in strength in spite of some losses. The rebuilt power of 106 Panzer Brigade was notable, and 269 Infantry Division must still be accounted the best unit in the area. However, there is no evidence that the enemy is bringing in any new formations of offensive proportions. On the contrary, the quality of reinforcements arriving seems to be declining.

b. Capabilities

The enemy's capabilities remain basically unchanged from those previously set forth in Weekly Intelligence Summaries No. 15 and 16.

The acceptance of a more limited intention on the Seventh US Army front is now obvious. Even in the ALSACE plain, enemy dispositions seem to indicate that STRASBOURG is the eventual objective, with SAVERNE now only a dim hope. However, to carry out what would appear to be his logical plan - advances south and southeast from the HARDT Mountains and against HAGUENAU, with aggressive action out of the RHINE bridgehead and due north from the COIMAR pocket - more strength is necessary.

The capabilities in the COIMAR pocket are also more limited. The relief of 269 Infantry Division by 338 VG and the subsequent shift of strength to the COIMAR-SELESTAT area further reduces the possibility of an attack northwest against the ST DIE-MOLSHEIM road directly from the HOHNECK area. Although the capability of action against MULHOUSE cannot be entirely discounted, the attempt to move directly north out of the pocket towards STRASBOURG must be favored as the primary German intention. Sufficient strength for a major operation - or even for this operation alone, should the HAGUENAU area be completely dominated by the Allies - is not present in the area. That the enemy could find the necessary forces in the Black Forest is always possible, but hardly probable at this time. Finally, the extension of a long flank along the RHINE-RHONE canal under heights now completely controlled by the Allies is not without its obvious weakness. A larger number of enemy troops will be required as the enemy moves forward than he could spare for so limited a profit.

2. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar Vosges Front)

At the close of the period the First and Nineteenth German Armies were disposed as follows: VOLKINGEN (Q 3573), FORBACH (Q 3965), SARREGUEMINES (Q 5056), RIMLING (Q 656), BITCHE (Q 7650), ALTHORN (Q 7540), DAMBACH (Q 9245), GLEEBOURG (R 1145), FT LOUIS (R 2321), DRUSENHEIM (R 1518), ROHRWILLER (R 1117), GAMBSHEIM (R 1010), South along RHINE to KRAFFT (V 9780), ERSTEIN (V 9480), OSTHEIM (V 7251), LE VALTIN (V 4644), ODEREN (V 4323), SWEIGHOUSE (V 5706), ILE N POLEON (V 7408), along the RHINE to NIFFER (V 8201) South along RHINE to Swiss border.

Declassified per
Simp Def Memo dtd 8 Nov 72
Simp Def Memo dtd 13 Jul 76
13 Jul 76

128
SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(a) FIRST GERMAN ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. KNOBELSDORT)

Immediately after the close of the preceding period the enemy committed his mobile forces which had been held in abeyance pending the outcome of his initial effort. At present, 172 Reserve Division is the only identified unit not committed, but there are strong indications that the Army reserve has been increased. Corps responsibilities began to take form as the XIII SS Panzer Corps was located by PW reports at SCHEIDT where it appears to have charge of the attack along the ROHRBACH axis. In the HARDT Mountain sector, the control of the forces must be vested in a Corps headquarters, as yet unidentified. Whether LXXXIX Corps controls all of the area east of the HARDT Mountains to the RHINE including the attack area of 21 Panzer and 25 PG is not clear as yet, but the mounting magnitude of the effort in the HAG-UENAU area would seem to require the presence of another corps, probably armored.

(1) XIII SS Panzer Corps

347 Infantry Division remained inactive on the front of the 106 Cavalry Group and the 103 US Infantry Division. 861 GR was identified on 7 January which confirmed the continued presence of the unit in the sector but no identification has been made of 860 GR since 1 January. Of the attached units 80 GR Repl Bn was identified 10 January. Consequently it is assumed that the division has been able to res and refit considerable portions of the unit while holding a line which both sides regard with only mild interest. Combat effectives including attached units are carried at 2,800.

19 Infantry Division continued to hold the sector opposite the 44 US Infantry Division while contributing to the advance in the HARDT Mountain sector by the shift of elements of 59 GR from the left flank of the divisional sector (identified by document as Q 6055) to the western edge of the HARDT salient where it opposes the 36 US Division. The major portion of the division, however, continued to oppose the 44 US Division as the 73 GR and 74 GR were identified on the 6th and 7th of January respectively. Total combat effective strength including miscellaneous units such as the 202 Stomach Bn and BG KLEIN would probably not be more than 2,400.

17 SS PG Division has been fighting in front of the 44 US Division and the 100 US Division since the attack was launched on 1 January. Both PGR's were identified during the period indicating no substantial change in positions. In addition to the Assault Gren Bn spotted on 4 January the division has attached the 59 Forress MG Bn and OCS WIESBADEN unit. Considering the action in which it has been involved the strength is estimated at 2,800 combat effectives.

(2) Possible Unidentified Corps

559 VG Division had 1126 and 1127 VGR's in line on 9 January opposite the 36 US Division and the 100 US Division. The fact that 1125 VGR has not been committed since the attack started raises some doubts as to its actual existence, but it may have been cast in a defensive role for the area just west of BITCHE which has not been very active. Including BG HEITMANN strength is estimated at 1,900.

6 SS Mountain Division Nord bore the brunt of the effort in the southern part of the HARDT Mountain salient. Both the 11 and 12 SS Mountain Regiments were identified 11 January as was the Engineer Bn and the Ron Bn. Early in the period the Arty Regiment was also located and later it was found that the 506 SS PG Bn is one of the divisions attached units.

Regarding strength, PW's stated that the unit has sustained severe losses in Finland and Norway which had not been alleviated by reinforcements due to the hasty departure from Norway and Denmark. Therefore, the combat strength is now reckoned as being about 5,000, including possible reinforcements still arriving.

257 VG Division continued its eastward shift around the rim of the HARDT salient until the end of the period. It seems to have established itself in the south sector opposing the 36 US Division and the 45 US Division. All VGR's were identified during a period which was aggressive but not particularly offensive. Combat effectives: 1,800.

129
~~SECRET~~

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

351 VG Division committed all of its units against the 45 US Division front where 951, 952, and 953 VGR's were identified. The US VI Corps evidently took the unit into camp for it is reported that 951 was destroyed. Strength is estimated at 1,000.

36 Infantry Division pulled back during the period from the US XV Corps zone where it had attempted to assist the original attack by 17 SS PG Division. On 9 January elements of 118 GR turned up in a sector of the 45 US Division front in which the enemy's attitude was rather defensive. It is presumed that 87 GR and 165 GR are being refitted in the rear since their effectives were very low. The scanty information available makes it impossible to render estimate of the division's strength.

256 VG Division continued to support the pivotal position on the east flank of the HARDT salient. During the period all three regiments were identified on the 45 US Division front, but were comparatively inactive. The division has been given additional firepower with the attachment of 815 and 816 Super Heavy MG Bn. Total combat effectives: 2,100.

(3) LXXXIX Corps (and an unidentified Corps)
(CG: General HOEHNE)

It is unlikely that this Corps would be given command responsibility over such a formidable force as 21 Panzer Division and 25 PG Division on the RHINE flank. However, its presence in the area must be considered. Pending future clarification it is carried as having a passive mission which may be both defense and training.

21 Panzer Division was committed early in the period on the front of the 79 US Division after the effort in the HARDT sector was launched. 125 PGR, 192 PGR and 220 Engr Bn were identified on 8 January and were believed to be still in the proximate area at the close of the period even though they were not in close contact. The division received a considerable number of replacements in the period from the end of December to early January when it was out of line, but it is not felt that the refitting was entirely complete prior to its reappearance. Precise figures are still lacking but it is known that heavy losses were suffered in its effort this week which should materially reduce the estimated 4,000 it was credited with before the attack.

245 Infantry Division continued its static role opposite the northern front of the 45 US Division and the eastern portion of the 79 US Division. The only identification during the period was the capture of one PW from 937 GR on 8 January who stated that the mission of his unit was to insure road clearance for 21 Panzer Division. The fact that 935 and 936 GR's have not been identified since middle December may indicate that they have been refitted and may turn up in a revived condition. All factors considered, the division's strength in combat effectives is carried at 4,000 including the 600 accredited to XII/I Regiment (atchd).

25 PG Division supported the effort of 21 Panzer on the front of the 79 US Division and 14 US Armored Division and as the attack progressed remained in more constant contact than its partner. 35 and 113 PGR's were identified on 9 January while the Engr Bn, Rcn Bn and the 5 Tank Bn (an attached unit said by PW's to have about 40 tanks) put in an appearance as late as 11 January.

(b) THE RHINE FRONT

North of STRASSBOURG, the bridgehead over the RHINE River established during the previous period continued to exist as a harrassing factor. PW's taken from 553 VG Division in that sector stated that the operation is controlled by the XIV SS Corps. It has been further reported that XVIII SS Corps is charged with the area east of the RHINE and south of the VOSGES pocket which has been pregnant with reports of enemy activity.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

553 VG Division in the bridgehead was quiet at the period's close after all of its VGR's were identified by 9 January. The division appears to have incorporated diverse units into its regiments as is shown in the example of 1120 VGR which absorbed Volkssturm Bn STURMLINGER and Bn HOPPE. Other miscellaneous units (elements 2 SS Police Rgt; E/V Rgt; 35 Engr Bn; elements K/V Rgt; 1127 Fort Arty Bn) which were identified between 4-9 January appear to be under the command of 553 VG Division rather than subordinate to 405 zbV Division as was previously believed. Combat effective strength is estimated at 2,000-2,500 with about 30% still on the west bank of the river at the close of the period.

(c) NINETEENTH ARMY (CG: Gen. d. Inf. WIESE)

This command rose from its passive attitude this week and succeeded in stimulating considerable activity in its sector. A major reshuffling of forces took place as 716 Infantry Division, long out of contact, assumed control over a sector in the French I Corps zone. The 338 Infantry Division shifted to the northwest and took over the sector of 269 Infantry Division along the VOSGES ridges. The latter then proceeded to the northwest and was located at the end of the period just south of SELESTAT. Consequently it would appear that these changes took place in order to support the effort of 198 Infantry Division which attacked northwards along the RHINE-RHONE canal on 7 January.

(1) LXIV Corps (CG: Gen. Lt. HELMUTH THUMM)

198 Infantry Division advanced against the front of 1 DMI (Fr), reached the village of KRAFFT and succeeded in clearing the area between the canal and the RHINE River. During this period 326 GR and 308 GR were identified on 7 January and 11 January respectively. In addition, the 192 Engr Bn (11 Jan) 746 Engr Bn (12 Jan) and 198 Fusilier Bn (7 Jan) were located in the line. Including attached units it is estimated that combat effectives do not amount to more than 1,500.

106 Panzer Brigade provided the armored support to 198 Infantry Division. PW's state that after reorganization the Brigade consists of seven companies, three of which have armored reconnaissance vehicles with the other companies consisting of motorized infantry. They also indicate that the Bde has one bn of 40 tanks and SP guns. Probable strength of combat effectives: 800-1,000.

269 Infantry Division is in a new location opposing the 1 DMI and perhaps the 3 US Division. The 469 GR was identified on 11 January, but there has been no trace since 2 January of the 489 GR. Suspicious also is the lack of contact with 490 GR, last heard of in the middle of December.

That the division had been given a period for rest and refitting is obvious, but any estimate of strength is very difficult. Reinforcements from Norway reported in the Black Forest may be intended for this division.

189 VG Division continued to hold on the northwestern sector of the pocket opposite 3 US Division. 1213 VGR was identified early in the period but no appearance has been made by the other regiment (1212 VGR) since 28 December. Strength 700-1,000.

708 VG Division also holds a sector in front of the 3 US Division. 760 VGR was identified on 8 January and early in the previous period 748 VGR was located south of SELESTAT, probably now on the flank of 269 Infantry Division.

Combat effectives number about 1,000.

16 VG Division. The lack of identification of this unit since 29 December is rather indicative that a period of refitting is taking place in the rear areas.

DECLASSIFIED 13/
SECRET

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

Miscellaneous Units which are filling the gaps in the enemy lines in front of the 3 US Division are a variety of outfits from the various Wehrkreis. Combat effectives of their units now number about 3,000.

(2) LXIII Corps (CG: Lt. Gen. JOACHIM v. TRECKOW)

338 Infantry Division has taken over the former sector of 269 Infantry Division along the VOSGES Mountains and opposes the 10 DI and 2 DIM. 757 and 758 GR's were both identified during the period but the location of 759 GR has not been ascertained since 31 December when it was in the SENNHEIM area. Including newly arrived replacements strength of the division is estimated at 1,600.

159 VG Division is still in the southwest corner of the pocket opposing 2 DIM and 1 DB. 1209 VGR turned up on 9 January. However, last identifications of 1210 VGR and 1211 VGR were on 4 January and 29 December respectively. It is reported that 1209 VGR did reorganize and receive replacements (as was reported of 1210 VGR during the previous period) and the regiment's strength has now been upped to 600.

716 Infantry Division finally came out of obscurity when it took over the former 338 Division sector in the MULHOUSE area opposite 9 DIC. Although the 726 and 736 GR's were identified during this period after having been out of contact for almost one month, it is not practicable to attempt a strength estimate prior to the receipt of additional information.

BRIGADE HAFNER had elements identified on 10 January opposite the front held by 9 DIC and elements of the FFI. Combat effectives: 1,000.

(d) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Saar-Vosges Front)

Units in Contact and Divisional Reserve:
(Combat Effectives)

Seventh US Army	32,000
First French Army	17,000 *

Artillery Effectives:

Seventh US Army	15,000
First French Army (East of RHINE)	5,000

Reserves:

Build up opposite Seventh US Army	10,000 **
Units available in Black Forest	15,000

T O T A L 94,000

Tanks and SP Guns:

Seventh US Army in Contact	150-180
Seventh US Army in Reserve	70

First French Army in Contact	50- 60
First French Army in Reserve	30- 50

T O T A L 300-360

(*) Estimate has been raised on the basis of reports of reinforcements in VOSGES pocket.

(**) Estimate lowered due to the commitment of 21 Panzer; 25 PG; 553 VG Division.

SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

3. SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

At the close of the period enemy forces opposing the Sixth US Army Group on the Alpine front were disposed as follows: ALBERTVILLE (Z 1683), BOURG S MAURICE (Z 4680), BONNEVAL SUR ARC (H 5676), MODANE (K 4132), M TABOR (K 3022), AIGUILLES (N 3703), S QUEYRAS (N 4394), PONDAMINE (N 5050), ST SAUVEUR (N 4823), S MARTIN VESUBIE (N 6020), GRIMALDI (S 8088), MONTENEVRE (K 4602).

(a) Enemy Disposition

The Franco-Italian border is held by German and Italian forces which are recapitulated as follows:

- (1) The sector from the coast to ST MARTIN VESUBIE: 34 German Inf Division
- (2) The sector ST MARTIN VESUBIE to LARCHE PASS: Elements of the LITTORIO Division and possibly elements of 5 German Mountain Division.
- (3) The sector LARCHE PASS to MONT GENEVRE: Elements of 5 German Mountain Division and elements of MONTE ROSA Division.
- (4) Sector MONT GENEVRE to PETIT SAINT BERNARD and Swiss border: Elements of 5 German Mountain Division and elements of LITTORIO Division.

The enemy continued to demonstrate a defensive attitude with the usual patrolling and spasmodic artillery activity. The combat value of the troops opposing us has materially decreased since the tendency has set in to replace German units with Italian troops. Indicative of their attitude is the garrisoning of rear areas by German soldiers in order to protect their line of supply and possible lines of withdrawal. This is particularly true in the valley regions.

(b) ENEMY STRENGTH SIXTH US ARMY GROUP FRONT (Alpine Front)

The shifting of units, and the lack of positive information on the strength of the Italian troops renders an estimate of forces holding the Alpine front difficult, but it is conservatively estimated that the total does not exceed 10-12,000 with 60% carried as combat effectives.

SECRET

133
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

An attack begun 6/7 January out of the VOSGES pocket and along the RHINE - RHONE Canal cut a wide swath up to V 9469, as it combined with armored elements crossing the river near ERSTEIN (V 9480). In securing the Rhine bank, the enemy further gained the towns of OBERHEIM (V 8673) and GERSTHEIM (V 9776). Pressure continued strong in the area of HERBESHEIM (V 9272), and E of the ILL River, the enemy held all towns except KRAFFT (V 9780) by the period's end.

In the Rhine pocket N of STRASBOURG, HERLISSHEIM (R 1315) changed hands several times during the period, but was occupied by the enemy by 11 Jan, as DRUSENHEIM (R 1518) and GAMBESHEIM (R 1110) continued to be strongly held. STATTMATTEN (R 1921) was cleared of enemy by 12 Jan.

The futility of the enemy's attempts in the so-called MAGINOT corner, to break out through our cordon in the areas of STUNDWILLER (R 1836) and ASCHBACH (R 1837) caused a slight shift to the west of his area of attack. Momentary success was enjoyed by his push against HATTEN (R 1733) and by the end of the period he had partially occupied the town. Attacks begun briskly early in the period on RITTERSHOFFEN (R 1553) had decreased as the period closed.

In the HARDT Mountain pocket counterattacks were being launched on PHILIPPSBOURG (C 8742) as the isolated enemy forces in the area of WINGEN (C 7335) were mopped up as the period began. By 9 January, the enemy was digging in near ALTHORN (C 7540), offering stiff resistance there as well as at REIPERTSWILLER (C 8037). ALTHORN was successfully regained and counterattacks were launched from there and from WILDEN-GUTH (C 7837) as entrenching activity was observed on these flanks of the enemy salient.

Movement in the SAAR Zone at the beginning of the period between ERCHING (C 6557) and VOLMUNSTER (C 7258) led to armor-supported attacks from ERCHING. The drive was stopped only after the enemy had reached ACHEN (C 6049) and GROS REDERCHING (C 6252) on 8/9 January. Elsewhere in the zone small-scale attacks were dispersed by artillery or repulsed during the period as a late all-out attack on RIMLING (C 6455) took that town on 10 January. Activity flared up in the Western zone as small attacks and strong opposition were met in areas from Q 3370 - Q 3668. On the 12/13 January a concentration of 1300 troops and 150 vehicles was observed in the SAARBRUCKEN (C 3965) area.

5. COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPLIES.

A. TAC/R.

Bad weather throughout the week restricted the number of aerial observations to a minimum and made impossible any indication of trends in enemy military movements. However, the limited observation revealed active road movement within the COLMAR pocket on 8 and 10 Jan., and a concentration of 50 plus vehicles including tanks on the right bank of the Rhine River in the vicinity of KENZINGEN (W 0255) on 10 Jan.

Rail activity was very light in the FREIBURG area on 10 Jan., when a few trains including some flats were sighted on the lines radiating from the city. There was also some movement on the same day between OFFENBURG and KENZINGEN, and the marshalling yards at RASTATT, BUHL, and OFFENBURG showed increases in their holdings of rolling stock.

On the rail lines east of KARLSRUHE - MAINZ, no cover was obtained during the week and the scanty reports concerning movement in the Saar region revealed that some rail activity was taking place on the BAD KREUZNACH - KIRN lines on 10 Jan. Scattered road movement was also sighted on this same day between SAARBRUCKEN and KAISERSLAUTERN. On 12 January, a single observation yielded the information that about 150 vehicles including armor, plus about 1500 troops were converging from the north on SAARBRUCKEN.

The enemy appeared more daring during the past week as regards road and rail movement during the daylight hours. This was no doubt due to the inclement weather which prevailed during the period. Numerous prisoner of war reports have been received stating that in certain in-

SECRET
stances fighter/bombers have bottled up road movements sufficiently to prevent the arrival of supporting weapons.

B. SUPPLIES.

Interrogation of PW's from various formations on Seventh Army Front during the past week indicates that supplies of ammunition and rations were generally sufficient. However, due to Allied air activity, local shortages occasionally developed.

PW's stated that the enemy's current policy is not to establish large ammunition stores, but that he prefers to create a number of well dispersed small dumps in order to achieve a measure of protection against air attacks. Some dumps of this type were claimed to be in the vicinity of CONTWIG (Q 7773), east of ZWEIBRUCKEN. This appears to be consistent with the enemy's known practice of siting supply installations in fairly close proximity to the LANDAU - ZWEIBRUCKEN railway.

The two known POL dumps belonging to the enemy in the Alsace pocket are both located north of COLMAR and are well sited to maintain the armored forces attacking towards STRASBOURG. In addition, the enemy has a large fuel depot in the Moos Wald (W 03) as a potential reserve east of the Rhine.

The FREIBURG - BRISACH - COLMAR rail line continues to be the main supply route into the pocket, with pontoon bridges and numerous ferries in operation to insure adequate supply.

C. BOMBING OF SINGEN.

The bombing of the SINGEN railroad center on 25 December completely destroyed the large rail bridge over the River Aach thus cutting lines of communication with IMMENDINGEN to the north and SCHAFFHAUSEN to the southwest. The marked effect which the destruction of this rail bridge had upon this communications system is self evident by the fact that for a period of 11 days all through traffic toward the front had to be re-routed through RADOLFZELL (W 9503) and SIGMARINGEN (X 1044). The special effort of repair crews working both day and night stresses the importance of the strategic rail lines through SINGEN to IMMENDINGEN and SCHAFFHAUSEN. By the night of 5 January, provisional repairs had made it possible for through traffic to be resumed.

D. CAMOUFLAGE OF TANK CARS.

German railway officials are reported to have ordered many thousands of camouflage cases for railroad fuel tank cars. In the past it has been indicated that tank cars were being disguised as boxcars, but this activity was restricted to those areas which were particularly liable to air attacks. The present wide scale effort to conceal tank cars is now necessary since no area is any longer immune from aerial attack. Camouflage may therefore be used in order to protect the contents of these cars and to avoid making known the location of production plants or possible storage points.

6. COUNTER - INTELLIGENCE.

SECURITY REFRESHER.

As the initial infiltration scare begins to wear off, security alertness tends to lag. This offers a vulnerability which the enemy will be quick to exploit. It would be dangerous to imagine that the Germans have exhausted their bag of tricks in the line of infiltrating GI clad soldiers or agents in civilian clothes. Careless guards are a costly gamble. Hence the following tips are republished with the suggestion of individual dissemination to all road guards and MPs. Each one should know these things:

WAYS OF SPOTTING GERMANS IN AMERICAN UNIFORM

1. In halting vehicles question the driver because, if Ger-

~~SECRET~~

man, he will be the one who speaks and understands the least English. The best English speaker of the group will wear an officer's uniform and sit in the front seat next to the driver. Thus, the best way to trap these parties is to ask the driver for his trip ticket, and then ask the driver some questions which he will have to answer.

2. Helmets are usually not marked with signs designating officers or NCO's.

3. Dog tags should be compared with identification cards. Ask for serial number. Staff cars must be stopped also, and you must forget rank when asking for dog tags, ASN, etc. Some of these GI-clad Germans are posing as high-ranking officers. One is supposed to be dressed as a Brigadier General. None of the Germans captured so far in GI uniform has known his "ASN".

4. Soldiers offering paybooks as means of identification are suspicious and ought to be carefully checked.

5. AGO cards used by Germans are Form 65-4, which carries an officer's counter-signature below holder's signature. However, 65-1 is the form generally carried by American officers. Forged AGO cards may be brand new, filled out by the German himself, signed by him, and then dirtied up a bit; but creases in the card can usually be spotted as new.

6. Trip tickets should be checked in rear areas.

7. All personnel not knowing the password should be regarded with suspicion and should be investigated. The password must never be given to unknown soldiers by guards or control posts. It is known to have been done in the past.

8. On several occasions Germans, posing as Americans, were dressed only partly in American uniform. Therefore, uniforms should be closely checked.

9. Staff cars being used by the Germans are believed to be Citroens painted khaki with the white star. Also look out for persons riding in the rear of trucks.

10. Simple questions should be asked which American personnel should know the answers to as a further means of identification.

11. Don't forget that any German jeep party will be heavily armed on a desperate mission. In order to facilitate escape they may be carrying phials of acid to be thrown into the faces of allied personnel, so one man should cover while another inspects credentials.

Eugene L. Harrison
EUGENE L. HARRISON
Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S, G-2

DISTRIBUTION

SPECIAL

INCL. 3

Incl. #1 - Rhine Bridges.
Incl. #2 - Sixth US Army Group
Front.

136
~~SECRET~~